This week, Judge Furman ordered U.S. Secretary of Commerce Wilbur Ross Jr. to sit for a deposition in a case challenging the constitutionality of adding a question about citizenship status to the 2020 U.S. census questionnaire.  The question had not appeared on the census questionnaire since 1950; according to the complaint, the question was purposefully added to decrease the response rate among immigrant communities, leading to fewer public services and less Congressional representation in those areas.

Judge Furman had previously found that the plaintiffs had “made a strong preliminary or prima facie showing that they will find material beyond the Administrative Record indicative of bad faith” and allowed discovery into the decision to add the citizenship question back to the census.  Judge Furman found that the deposition of Secretary Ross himself was required because of Secretary Ross’s high degree of personal involvement in the decision and the extent to which his credibility and intent was thus at issue
Continue Reading Judge Furman: Secretary of Commerce Must Sit for Deposition Over Census Citizenship Question

In an opinion yesterday, Judge Furman weighed in on  — and certified for interlocutory appeal — an issue that has divided judges in the Southern District:  whether the requirement that FLSA settlements be approved by the DOL or the Court can be avoided by a settlement accomplished via a Rule 68 offer of judgment.  Because Rule 68 is phrased in mandatory terms (when an offer is accepted, the “clerk must then enter judgment”), some courts have held that there is no room for judicial or DOL approval.

Judge Furman disagreed:
Continue Reading Judge Furman: Parties Cannot Circumvent Approval of FLSA Settlements with Rule 68 Offer of Judgment

In a 102-page ruling Friday, Judge Furman granted in part, and denied in part, a motion to dismiss certain of the claims being pursued in the GM ignition switch MDL.

Perhaps most significantly, Judge Furman rejected the plaintiffs’ claims that were based on the theory that all GM customers – including those who bought GM cars without any defect — were injured because they “thought they were buying cars made by “a ‘brand that had a reputation for producing safe and reliable cars,’” but were really buying cars from a cost-cutting company whose misconduct “result[ed] in lower resale values across the board” for the plaintiffs.

Judge Furman noted that the theory was concededly unprecedented, and emphasized that a major new legal claim should be created by the legislature, not the courts:
Continue Reading Judge Furman Rejects “Brand Devaluation” Theory in GM Ignition Switch MDL

In an opinion today, Judge Furman largely denied a motion to dismiss the city of Perry, Iowa’s putative class action (first covered here) against the makers of so-called “flushable” wipes that allegedly are not flushable at all and allegedly damage the city’s sewer systems.
Continue Reading Judge Furman Allows City’s Case Against “Flushable” Wipe Makers to Proceed

Yesterday, Judge Furman issued a written opinion following up on his earlier denial of a motion to replace the lead plaintiffs’ counsel for the ongoing GM ignition switch litigation.  Judge Furman lauded the plaintiffs’ steering committee for coordinating the massive litigation effort – including over three hundred depositions and almost fifty motions in limine – in just a year and a half.  Judge Furman reiterated that the motion was untimely, and that the movants (other plaintiffs’ counsel with concerns about the direction of the MDL’s leadership) had not met the high burden for unseating lead counsel.
Continue Reading Judge Furman Tells GM Ignition Switch MDL Lawyers to “Return to Focusing on What is Truly at Stake in This Litigation”

Earlier today, GM settled with the third bellwether plaintiff prior to trial in the ongoing litigation over allegedly defective ignition switches in GM vehicles.  Of three bellwether cases so far, the first was withdrawn before a verdict, the second was decided in GM’s favor, and the third has now settled.  Plaintiff’s counsel in the third