Judge McMahon issued a memo today to the parties scheduled for a forthcoming civil trial, and the memo sets forth various rules reflecting her efforts to keep trials running efficiently.

Highlights of the memo include: Continue Reading Judge McMahon’s Trial Memo: Argue Objections In “25 Words or Less” And Other Guidance

In the long-running defamation case brought by Sarah Palin against the New York Times (see our prior coverage here), Judge Rakoff issued an opinion yesterday explaining his ruling from the bench granting judgment as a matter of law to the Times. The ruling was announced orally to counsel at the close of trial, before the jury returned its verdict. The jury subsequently ruled in the Times’ favor, as well.

The central issue in the case was whether the Times acted with “actual malice” when it issued an editorial erroneously suggesting that the actions of Palin’s political action committee – using “stylized cross hairs” over the districts of several members of Congress in online materials – was responsible for the “political incitement” of Jared Lee Loughner, who killed six people and wounded many others, including Representative Gabby Giffords, in a 2011 mass shooting.

Judge Rakoff found that the author, James Bennet, did not act with actual malice because, among other things, he was so quick to direct that the matter be corrected the morning after the editorial was published: Continue Reading Judge Rakoff: It Would “Chill Protected Speech” To Hold NY Times Liable for Careless, Quickly-Corrected Editorial About Sarah Palin

Last week, Judge Liman granted in part plaintiff ChromaDex’s motion for summary judgment on part of defendant Elysium’s counterclaim for false advertising under the Lanham Act. The case arose from a dispute between the two competitors over the sale of nutritional products claiming to improve cellular health and cellular aging. Elysium argued that statements made by a blogger regarding ChromaDex’s product were false, and should be attributable to ChromaDex under the Lanham Act, because the blogger was a ChromaDex shareholder who was paid by ChromaDex for referring customers. ChromaDex argued that it was not liable for statements that appeared on a third-party blog, regardless of whether they were false, material, or caused injury, because the statements did not constitute “advertising or promotion,” as required under the Lanham Act.

Judge Liman agreed with ChromaDex, finding that Elysium had not presented evidence that ChromaDex had an agency relationship with Shelly Albaum, the blogger. Furthermore, Judge Liman found that Elysium had not presented evidence that ChromaDex controlled the content of Albaum’s blog. Elysium cited to an email between a ChromaDex executive (Jaksch) and Albaum regarding whether the executive wanted Albaum to post a certain article. Judge Liman concluded: Continue Reading Judge Liman: Blogger-Shareholder Touting a Company’s Product Was Not Its Agent for Purposes of Lanham Act

It is rare for a judge to express views on the merits of a case ahead of a trial, but last week Judge Engelmayer did so, apparently at the urging of the parties who both thought that it would foster settlement. The views were set forth in an Order last week denying summary judgment in a case over escrowed funds following a corporate acquisition (see an earlier ruling here with more background). In the Order, Judge Engelmayer “took note of counsels’ observation that their attempts to resolve this matter would be assisted by some guidance from the Court as to its present assessment of certain issues in the case.”

Accordingly, ahead of a forthcoming bench trial, Judge Engelmayer essentially foreshadowed that the buyer had a strong case that the seller breached a particular warranty in the deal documents, but some risk associated with its associated theory of damages: Continue Reading Judge Engelmayer Shows Willingness to Preliminarily Assess Contract Dispute, to Help Foster Settlement

In a new putative class action complaint filed today, former Miami Dolphins head coach Brian Flores accuses the NFL of racial discrimination in hiring. One aspect of the allegations concerns the “Rooney Rule,” by which teams are supposed to interview at least one diverse candidate when coaching and management vacancies arise. Continue Reading Complaint: Bill Belichik’s Text to the Wrong “Brian” Proves Giants Engaged in “Sham” Interview of Black Coaching Prospect

In a complaint filed Tuesday, a non-profit organization and a pastor from the South Bronx sued N.Y. AG Letitia James, alleging that New York’s rules governing the unauthorized practice of law (“UPL”) prevent them from advising low income clients facing debt collection lawsuits, in violation of their First and Fourteenth Amendment Rights.  The non-profit organization plans to train non-lawyers to provide “reliable, free, straightforward, and narrowly circumscribed” advice to low income New Yorkers facing debt collection lawsuits “on a strictly non-commercial basis to ensure that defendants can understand their rights and respond to the debt collection lawsuits against them.”  However, New York’s UPL rules make it a crime and civilly sanctionable to engage in, solicit, or aid in the provision of legal advice by non-lawyers. Continue Reading Complaint: New York’s Rules on Unauthorized Practice of Law Violate Non-Profit’s First and Fourteenth Amendment Rights

In an opinion Friday, Judge Cote concluded that a trade secret holder’s accidental revelation of trade secret information to a competitor, in connection with due diligence for a possible transaction, could not constitute the competitor’s acquisition of the information by “improper means,” as required to prevail on a misappropriation claim. The plaintiff, TransPerfect, argued that the defendants used information learned during the diligence process to poach TransPerfect’s clients.

While Judge Cote agreed that certain information TransPerfect had shared with the defendants constituted trade secrets, she found that TransPerfect had failed to adduce evidence that defendants acquired the information by improper means, as required under the Defend Trade Secrets Act: Continue Reading Judge Cote: Acquiring Trade Secrets Accidentally Produced In Deal Diligence Is Not Acquisition by “Improper Means”

In an opinion today, Judge Furman dismissed a putative class action against a retailer, Bonobos, whose customer data (names, addresses, emails, and the like) was stolen and posted online. Judge Furman found that the plaintiff, Bradley Cooper, did not allege a level of impending harm or risk that was sufficient to establish standing to sue. Judge Furman contrasted the facts at issue with those in other cases where more sensitive information was stolen (like Social Security numbers), giving rise to high risk of identity theft.

Cooper had sought to establish standing based on his alleged risk of “credential stuffing,” which is described in the opinion as a “technique in which [hackers] enter credentials gained from a hack into third-party websites, hoping that they will match an existing account because the consumer has reused the same password elsewhere,” but Judge Furman was not persuaded: Continue Reading Judge Furman Dismisses Data Breach Class Action Because Stolen Information Didn’t Give Rise to “Impending” Harm

In an opinion Monday, Judge McMahon denied a motion by Blackberry and certain former executives for summary judgement in a securities class action. In the same ruling, she denied Blackberry’s motion to strike the plaintiffs’ Rule 56.1 statement, which allegedly contained improper legal arguments instead of factual responses.  Judge McMahon criticized the motion as “pointless” and “desperate”:

Defendants filed a Rule 56.1 statement in this case, and Plaintiffs filed their responsive paragraph-by-paragraph contention, citing evidence, of the facts in dispute. At times, Plaintiffs admittedly stray into improper legal argument in their “factual” recitations. But Plaintiffs version of the facts — and the evidence supporting that view of the facts — is perfectly apparent from reading the Rule 56.1 statement.

Defendants move to strike Plaintiffs’ responses in whole and “deem Defendants’ undisputed facts admitted.” This is a silly and pointless motion, one obviously (and desperately) made because, unless the Rule 56.1 statement is stricken, the record is replete with disputed facts. . . . .

Plaintiffs’ responses and objections, which dispute Defendants’ facts and cite to evidence that rebuts Defendants’ statement of facts, does not contravene Rule 56.1. Rather, it is Defendants’ motion to strike that is procedurally improper. To the extent that Plaintiffs incorporate legal argument into their responses and objections — and they do — this Court will simply not consider those statements.

In an opinion issued yesterday, Judge Seibel rejected a plaintiff’s argument that a defendant in a multi-defendant case must consent to removal within 30 days of service on its statutory agent, regardless of when the defendant actually received the complaint. The case was filed in New York state court against two defendants, one of whom timely removed the action. The second defendant consented to removal of the action four days after receiving the complaint from its agent for service of process, but more than 30 days after plaintiff had served the complaint on the defendant’s statutory agent (the Secretary of State). The plaintiff moved to remand, arguing that defendant’s consent to removal was late because it occurred more than thirty days after plaintiff had served the Secretary of State.

The plaintiff argued that the Second Circuit’s holding that the removal clock does not start running upon service of a statutory agent was inapplicable to cases involving the rule of unanimity, codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b)(2)(A), which requires that “all defendants who have been properly joined and served must join in or consent to the removal of the action.”  According to the plaintiff, “application of cases holding that service on the Secretary of State does not start the thirty-day removal clock improperly ‘conflates’ the rule of unanimity with provisions setting out the thirty-day removal period.” Continue Reading Judge Seibel: Service on Secretary of State Does Not Trigger Clock for Consent to Removal in Multi-Defendant Case