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1creclec 1 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK 2 3 CLEANTECH INNOVATIONS, INC., 4 Plaintiff, 5 11 CV 9358 (KBF) V. 6 NASDAQ STOCK MARKET, LLC, et al., 7 Defendants. 8 9 10 December 27, 2011 11 10:10 a.m. 12 Before: 13 HON. RICHARD J. SULLIVAN, 14 District Judge 15 Sitting in Part I 16 **APPEARANCES** 17 FENSTERSTOCK & PARTNERS, LLP Attorneys for Plaintiff BY: BLAIR C. FENSTERSTOCK 18 EUGENE D. KUBLANOVSKY 19 MICHAEL T. PHILLIPS 20 ARLEN SPECTER Attorney for Plaintiff 21 STRADLEY RONON STEVENS & YOUNG, LLP 22 Attorneys for Plaintiff BY: PAULA D. SHAFFNER 23 GIBSON DUNN & CRUTCHER, LLP 24 Attorneys for Defendants BY: SCOTT P. MARTIN 25 JAMES L. HALLOWELL

(Case called)

(In open court)

THE COURT: Good morning to you. Thanks for all being here. I hope I haven't ruined anybody's post-holiday plans.

We were here last week, obviously discussing the defendants' motion to vacate the state court TRO. And so I allowed the plaintiffs an opportunity to respond, which I have now received and got on Friday. The memorandum of law in opposition to defendant's motion, which includes basically a cross motion to continue the temporary restraining order. And then I've also received a letter, December 23rd letter, which is in the form of a premotion letter to me, consistent with my individual practices, that really is, I guess, for the same relief. It's really about extending the state TRO.

I've not heard from the defendants related to that cross motion or this new motion. Did you intend or want to respond to this?

MR. MARTIN: Yes, your Honor. We would either be heard today, or we'd prefer to put in a response. Obviously we oppose the TRO, for the reasons we've discussed previously.

THE COURT: Well, I mean, we should all keep in mind that this is Judge Forrest's case, so I don't want to tread lightly on her. I'm the Part I judge, so I'm covering for her this week, and I'll do what I have to do since there is a TRO that's on the table right now.

But to the extent people want opportunities to brief things more fully, she's back next week and I guess, then, that would go to her, depending on the schedule we adopt.

All right. Well, I've looked at the papers. It seems to me -- I'm happy to hear you further, but it seems to me that really the state court has no business issuing TROs in a matter like this. I know of no authority in which a state court has, in fact, exercised jurisdiction in a case involving a delisting of an exchange. I think the statute is very clear that this is exclusively for federal courts.

And again, I'm puzzled as to how Judge Schweitzer could have issued the ruling he did. Even if there are some state constitutional claims, this case is really all about the delisting of a company on the NASDAQ exchange, and whether or not NASDAQ complied with its own internal rules and with the overlay of SEC regulations. So it's really difficult for me to see why this was brought to state court in the first place, or why the state court felt that it had jurisdiction.

So, Mr. Fensterstock, I'm happy to hear you, but I didn't see anything in your papers in the form of authority that would suggest that I'm wrong about that.

MR. FENSTERSTOCK: Judge, knowing how thorough you are, I am not going to suggest that I can come up with any more authority than what we put in our papers. But obviously, with a TRO in place until it's vacated or modified by you, we were

through the office that we're required to go through. I have

MS. SHAFFNER: We filed the appeal with the SEC

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filed motions for a stay in the past in largely disciplinary matters that often get granted ex parte same day.

THE COURT: Right.

MS. SHAFFNER: This is a bit unusual and novel and -THE COURT: Is it that novel? You know better than I
did, and perhaps Senator Specter knows better than any of us,
but I can't imagine it's that novel that a company gets
delisted. It must happen from time to time.

MS. SHAFFNER: What is novel is asking the SEC for a stay of the delisting under those circumstances. The commentary to the rule, and I'm sure it's been brought up to your Honor before, suggests that during the -- that process, the Form 25 process, that the parties have an opportunity to enforce their federal or state court remedies, which is why this proceeding happened in the first instance. We've had no ruling from the SEC. It was filed, and we pointed out to them that there did not have to be a hearing or anything to that effect.

THE COURT: Right. But in fairness, look, this wasn't really filed until Friday, right? I mean, I think you may have gotten the date of the 22nd, but it was after business hours when you filed it, right?

MS. SHAFFNER: It was, your Honor.

THE COURT: Because we finished up after 5:00.

MR. FENSTERSTOCK: We did it as quickly as we could,

but you're right.

THE COURT: So they did not have a ton of time to get their arms around this. Have you had any communication with a live person?

MS. SHAFFNER: Not yet, your Honor. We'll try to do that today. The one item of note in NASDAQ's response is that NASDAQ was in agreement with us that there is no provision for discovery of any type on the due process issues that we've raised in court before the SEC. So while we have asked for a discovery order from the SEC, there is nothing within the rules of the appellate process at the SEC which would permit us to get discovery in that proceeding.

THE COURT: All right. But, I mean, I guess there's a couple things. First, we're talking about vacating or -- vacating the state court's order on the grounds that the state court didn't have jurisdiction. Once that's resolved, then I guess we get to the next motion, which is that I, on behalf of Judge Forrest, issue a TRO enjoining the delisting pending resolution of the appeal before the SEC.

And we can talk about what are the criteria that a court should be considering in deciding whether or not a stay would be -- you basically would be appealing the SEC's failure to grant a stay, right, at this point?

MR. FENSTERSTOCK: Yes, your Honor. And there's some serious public policies involved here, and Senator Specter

would like to address that.

But let me make one comment. This whole process started a week ago Monday. We brought our TRO on notice.

THE COURT: Right.

MR. FENSTERSTOCK: NASDAQ decided not to put in any papers before Judge Schweitzer. We were here before you last week. You asked NASDAQ, is there any harm with a TRO? They never answered that there was any harm. We have now had eight days since last Monday when we started this process. NASDAQ has not been able to show you an iota of harm that would follow an extension of the existing TRO.

THE COURT: I guess, but, again, just to be clear, I mean, it's you that has to establish irreparable harm.

MR. FENSTERSTOCK: That's correct.

THE COURT: The balance of hardships and public policy are other factors to be considered, and that's valid. We'll consider them, if we get there.

But one of the questions I asked last week is: What is the harm in the delisting? Because it seems to me, if you're suspended now, a delisting doesn't really change that much. It may a little here and there, I don't know. But it would seem one of the points you made, and you make again in your papers, is that to be delisted would make it harder to get relisted in the event that the SEC or a court were to reverse NASDAQ's decision. Right?

MR. FENSTERSTOCK: That was one of the points, your Honor, yes.

THE COURT: I still find that hard to understand. It seems to me that if NASDAQ was wrong, that either the SEC or the Court of Appeals would order them to relist the company without making the company go through all the hoops that it would have to go through if it were initiating the listing process.

MR. FENSTERSTOCK: Let me make two points on that. First point --

THE COURT: We're jumping around a little bit.

MR. FENSTERSTOCK: That's okay. In a rational world, you're absolutely right. NASDAQ or the SEC, as I understand it -- assuming the court didn't direct SEC or NASDAQ to do something, which you raised last week -- NASDAQ or the SEC can apply any requirements they want for a company to be relisted.

Number two, Mr. Staloff's affidavit in the TRO application below portrayed a doom's day scenario which is not hypothetical. Mr. Staloff suggested that there was a potential financing which the company was not able to get because of the potential delisting.

THE COURT: But that's true with a suspension as well, isn't it?

MR. FENSTERSTOCK: Well, no. There are levels, your Honor. There are levels of incredulity with respect to a

company. If you are suspended, that's one level. If you're delisted, it has the perception of a whole different level.

And I think with regard to the public policies, I think Senator Specter can address that, if you will, your Honor.

THE COURT: All right. Well, right now I want to stay focused. We're going to do this in pieces.

I want to first deal with whether or not the state court had jurisdiction. That's really the motion that brought you all here. That's a motion to vacate the state court's ruling on the grounds that it lacked jurisdiction to issue a ruling in the first place.

So are you still arguing that the state court had jurisdiction, Mr. Fensterstock?

MR. FENSTERSTOCK: I am, your Honor.

THE COURT: You are. All right. And so what is the basis for your argument that the state court has that jurisdiction, given the plain language of the statute, which seems to suggest that exchange act -- The Exchange Act is exclusively the province of federal courts?

MR. SPECTER: Your Honor, might I respond?
THE COURT: Sure.

MR. SPECTER: On that point specifically. There are a couple of other points that I'd like to make briefly. And I now read the statute, which provides the district courts of the United States shall have exclusive jurisdictional violations of

this chapter or the rules and regulations thereunder in all suits in equity and actions of law brought to enforce any liability or duty created by this chapter or the rules and regulations thereunder.

THE COURT: Right.

MR. SPECTER: Well, this matter does not involve liability or duty created by this chapter. The action brought in the state court involves the liability under the Constitution of the State of New York.

THE COURT: But it's really about the failure of the SRO to abide by its own rules, which are rules that are promulgated in accordance with the SEC's jurisdiction, right? SEC regulations that require them to do this. And then there's --

MR. SPECTER: Well, it involves whether there has been due process of law. And that references the NASDAQ rules. But the basic authority for challenging NASDAQ and the state courts has been the New York State Constitution.

THE COURT: Well, is there any precedent for this?

Are you aware of state courts that have been -- that have exercised jurisdiction in a delisting case involving The Exchange Act?

MR. SPECTER: Well, I have not, your Honor. But we have one right at hand, and that is what this Judge Schweitzer did.

THE COURT: Well, I understand that. But I guess the issue is if state courts were granted this kind of authority, and that was consistent with The Exchange Act, it would seem to me we'd have other examples of that. But I haven't found any. It doesn't sound like you have either.

MR. FENSTERSTOCK: No, but you know --

MR. SPECTER: Wait. On its face, your Honor, I would submit the argument that the statute talks about actions to enforce any liability created by this chapter. And that is not what we're asserting. We're asserting that the state court — a liability under the Constitution of the State of New York. We're not asserting a duty or a liability or a provision of the securities act.

THE COURT: Well, you're doing more than that. I mean, the complaint is not exclusively about a violation of New York State Constitution, right? The complaint -- we can look at it, but, I mean, it's really all about The Exchange Act, isn't it?

MR. SPECTER: It is true that there are other causes of action in the complaint, but that does not change the fact that there is a cause of action which is bottomed exclusively on the State of New York.

THE COURT: Well, I agree with that. That's obvious, right? There clearly is -- one of the causes of action is based on a New York State constitutional provision. The issue

is, I think, was it the intent of the folks who wrote The Exchange Act to have delisting decisions taken into state court, have state courts deciding these things, or was it something that was designed to be kept in federal courts? First, let's be clear. First, through the SEC, and then if the SEC ultimately decided, then there'd be recourse in federal courts. Isn't that a logical and coherent system of The Exchange Act?

MR. SPECTER: Permit me to amplify on my argument. In looking to due process, we are looking to a practice here where the indicators are prima facie that NASDAQ has engaged in discriminatory practices. And this goes to the issue of due process under the New York constitution. Mr. Emmon of NASDAQ has said that it doesn't matter whether the consultant's reputation is deserved or not. What matters is that he is notorious, and that is in the context of discrimination against a Chinese company.

THE COURT: I think that's really in the context of whether or not plaintiff was being fully forthcoming when asked for documents, right?

MR. SPECTER: Well, that gets into the merits. And if we take a look there, I would submit to your Honor that it's conclusive that the plaintiff was forthcoming. But Emmon went on the to say that over the past year we've developed expansive procedures to use in reviewing just this type of company that

go well beyond what we do with other applications.

What piqued my interest in this case involved these discriminatory practices. And part of what we hope to get today, in addition to discovery that they haven't followed their own rules submitting it to each board member, is an opportunity to see what they have done.

And this case, if I may say, your Honor, involves a much broader interest, national interest, for the parties involved here. We have an active foreign trade policy seeking access to markets in China, great markets there. And here we have a case where access to US markets have been denied a Chinese company on what is prima facie already on the record discriminatory practices. And we think that we will find within the NASDAQ files more evidence that this is going on.

THE COURT: But you're already appealing that to the SEC, and that's the proper channel for the appeal in the first instance, right?

MR. SPECTER: Well, not really, Judge.

THE COURT: Why do you say that?

MR. SPECTER: We are looking for an opportunity to establish for the record that they haven't followed their procedures.

THE COURT: But there is an appeals process that allows the aggrieved party, any company, to appeal the decision of the exchange, the individual SRO, to the SEC, correct? And

that has been commenced. You folks commenced that in November.

The SEC is presumably looking at that.

MR. SPECTER: We come to a court of equity because of the irreparable harm, the fact that this company is facing insolvency. I grant you when you started talking about listing and relisting, you're in a nebulous area. But the affidavits which have been submitted here are that this company is on the brink of insolvency.

THE COURT: But, I mean, I understand that. But these are arguments that can be, and should have been made to the SEC in the first instance. I mean, I think it's an interesting issue as to what happens when at the time you appeal the SEC, the NASDAQ decision, you also ask for a stay of the delisting. But that didn't happen here. I mean, what the delisting — the request to stay the delisting was made the Friday before Christmas, you know, with basically half a business day left to get it done before the delisting would go into effect. It's kind of hard to fault the SEC for that. And really, the scheme allows the SEC to review what NASDAQ has done and the Court of Appeals to review what the SEC has done. Why isn't that sufficient process?

MR. SPECTER: Because if those proceedings are allowed to take their course, this company will no longer be in business. This company lost an opportunity to build on an \$8 million contract for the State of New Jersey on towers.

There's a \$100 million contract in the offing, and by the time the SEC decides this case, there won't be any case left for it to decide because there won't be any company left.

THE COURT: But I don't know if that's the fault of those who didn't move for a stay until the day before Christmas or the fault of the SEC for not jumping to it the same day.

But in terms of due process, I mean, there is a process in place that allows for the SEC to review the SRO decision, and then the SEC to stay the delisting, if the equities require it, right? There is a process here. It just wasn't utilized here. But one could argue this is an end run around the SEC process, which courts are obviously reluctant to do.

And state courts, it's not clear to me what role, if any, they have in this whole process.

MR. SPECTER: Well, where equitable proofs are submitted of irreparable harm, and there's nothing more irreparable than going out of business --

THE COURT: But is that your -- you really do believe that that was the intent of this structure, then, is to allow anybody who can claim irreparable harm to just go running into whatever court they want to, state or federal, because a court of equity trumps the scheme that was developed in The Exchange Act?

MR. SPECTER: It would have to do more than make a claim. You'd have to prove it, which I think we have done.

THE COURT: Well, I think the issue here, right now, is whether or not the state court had jurisdiction. And I haven't seen any authority suggested they do. It seems to me that the remedy is exclusively federal, and it requires the SEC to make a ruling before federal courts get involved. And so cite me authority or legislative history or something that suggests that to be incorrect.

MR. FENSTERSTOCK: The legislative history, your
Honor, I think I pointed out to you, maybe not very eloquently
last week, but in the final rule making procedures, I think I
pointed out that -- and these are promulgated by the SEC. It
said, such notice -- that's the ten-day notice at the time -give investors and the public sufficient time to take any
action permitted under state and federal law. That implies -that's the legislative history of the ten-day rule. We did
that. The ten-day rule went into effect on the 16th of
December. On the 19th we gave notice. 16th was a Friday. The
19th was Monday. We gave notice when we went into court on
Tuesday, the 20th. That was the earliest we could go in.

So, your Honor, I think there are two issues here. I understand the jurisdictional issue. We're talking about --

THE COURT: I want to stay focused on that before we get to the other one.

MR. FENSTERSTOCK: Because we're talking about substance -- let's talk about just the state jurisdiction. You

asked, this must have happened many times, and then why isn't there a state court decision?

THE COURT: Right. Well, I would expect, given the --

MR. FENSTERSTOCK: And I agree --

THE COURT: -- the age of The Exchange Act.

MR. FENSTERSTOCK: I agree with your question. I agree with your question. But interestingly enough, I don't think there are any federal court decisions where an applicant like Cleantech faced a ten-day delisting, went into court, asked for a stay and raised a state constitutional issue. There is no case like that, as far as I know. We have not been able to find it.

So there are no federal cases, and there are no state cases. And the reason is, I think -- and Ms. Shaffner implied this -- that normally, when the NASDAQ -- probably any exchange but maybe more on NASDAQ -- delists a company, the company is in hurting economic shape. And normally they just go away. NASDAQ has ruled, and they go away. They don't even appeal to the SEC.

This is an extraordinary situation. Because we've discovered not only can this company survive if we get a stay, and we can follow our remedy to the SEC and the Circuit Court if we have to on the substantive issue of the appeal, but this is an extraordinary situation where we have discovered in the record that there's discrimination by the NASDAQ. And what's

important, your Honor, is NASDAQ's position on this is incredible, because over the weekend — and I wanted to bring you up to date. There was a piece that I left out. You know that I told you that NASDAQ opposed our motion for a stay.

NASDAQ also certified a record to the SEC for the appeal.

Ms. Shaffner —

THE COURT: Go back.

MS. SHAFFNER: More recently.

THE COURT: Not Friday?

MR. FENSTERSTOCK: No. But Ms. Shaffner's firm sent a letter to NASDAQ saying, we don't have certain documents that are in the record. Can we please see them? They wrote back, no.

THE COURT: Who wrote back?

MR. FENSTERSTOCK: NASDAQ.

THE COURT: NASDAQ?

MR. FENSTERSTOCK: Wrote back and said, no, we have no obligation to give you anything that's in the record. This is a continuum of discriminatory and abusive action by NASDAQ, which raises multiple issues on the likelihood of success and the other issues that don't go to the jurisdiction. And I understand that, your Honor. And I realize I'm wandering, because it's a mixed issue here relative to the state court jurisdiction on New York constitutional grounds and the irreparable harm and likelihood of success for the continuation

of the TRO.

So I realize I'm wandering, but I think there's a continuum of issues here which portrays a pattern of behavior by NASDAQ which is bullying, discriminatory, denies Cleantech due process because of one reason only: Because they're a China based company, and we have evidence of that.

THE COURT: I'm going to stay focused on the jurisdictional issue. And so nobody's getting any authority for me, right, one way or the other?

MR. FENSTERSTOCK: No further authority, your Honor.

THE COURT: Let me hear from the back table.

Do you have any more authority, Mr. Martin?

MR. MARTIN: Well, your Honor, a few points.

The first is there are cases in the federal system dealing with challenges to delisting. The *Belfort* case out of this court, the *Dimensional Visions* case, I believe it was, out of the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, they didn't expressly deal with this issue but they were federal cases. Now they didn't permit challenges to the delisting. They said, you can't do that sort of challenge, but they were federal cases.

THE COURT: They're getting to the next step, I think, about likelihood of success on the merits, because the SEC gets first bite at this apple. And then appeals are to the Court of Appeals, right?

MR. MARTIN: Yes, your Honor. But it does illustrate

that these cases, to the extent that they had been brought, had been brought in the federal system. And in more general --

THE COURT: But not many. You cited a couple cases in your papers.

MR. MARTIN: That's right, your Honor. There are not many, and we think the reason for that is — and again, this gets to the merits. These types of cases are impermissible.

But just on the jurisdictional point, we think the three most telling authorities — and we cite them in our papers — are Sparta Surgical out of the Ninth Circuit, Hawkins out of the Fifth Circuit, and the Christian Klein decision, Judge Sotomayor in this court. And each of those establish that even if you plead state law claims, as long as those claims are based on alleged violations of duties established by The Exchange Act, it has to go to federal court.

THE COURT: Right. Not delisting cases, right?

MR. MARTIN: They're not delisting cases.

THE COURT: But you're suggesting that's a difference that doesn't make any -- that's a distinction without a difference, right?

MR. MARTIN: Yes, your Honor. And, you know, in each case where you attempt to challenge SRO regulatory actions based on The Exchange Act, it doesn't matter whether you label it state law or federal law. The statute speaks to suits — any action based on liabilities created under The Exchange Act

or SEC rules or SRO rules. And so whether it's a challenge to delisting, the court's denial of membership or any other number of SRO regulatory activities, it has to go the federal courts, not the state court system.

THE COURT: All right. But you're saying that even a state district court has no role to play in this, right?

MR. MARTIN: Yes, your Honor. Once we get to the merits, we'd say that even the — this Court should not grant the relief because there's a process set up that goes through the SEC and then to the Court of Appeals. And there's definitely authority on that both in the Second Circuit and elsewhere. We cite it in our papers, but the Fiennes case in the circuit and Desiderio in the Second Circuit and the Series 7 in the DC circuit.

THE COURT: We'll come back to that, but I think the first issue is a jurisdictional one. And I think I'm basically where I was a week ago, or not quite a week ago.

All right. I'm certainly inclined to find that the state court didn't have jurisdiction to do this. I think that the scheme is a very clear one. And throwing in a state court claim doesn't get you out of the exclusive, exclusively federal jurisdiction that was contemplated by The Exchange Act. So I think that's the way I'm likely to go on that.

I want to hear argument now on the new motion, which is basically a TRO motion, as though you had brought this case

in federal court from the get-go.

Mr. Fensterstock, if you anticipated we'd be going there -- we talked about that a little last anytime, we talked about it a little today. The standard's pretty clear. I think you didn't cite the most recent Supreme Court case on this, which the Second Circuit has always had its own slightly different standard for a TRO. But I don't think there's any real dispute as to what the --

MR. FENSTERSTOCK: No. I think we know what the standard is, your Honor.

THE COURT: So I think I've heard you on this. I want to hear from the back table on this, all right? It is your argument that this -- I think what you're really saying is the district court doesn't even have jurisdiction to do this, right?

MR. MARTIN: Yes, your Honor. And we have several responses. Some of them get to the elements.

THE COURT: You haven't briefed this. This is the first time I'm hearing this. You've sort of gestured toward it last week, but I haven't seen any real argument on that.

MR. MARTIN: That's right, your Honor. There is a brief section of our motion from last week that cites the relevant case law for this proposition. It cites Fiennes, Desiderio, Series 7.

But the basic layout, there are three separate

arguments here. One of them is just the exhaustion argument, that it has to go through the process that Congress created.

The separate argument is the argument that was in Fiennes, Desiderio and Series 7, that says once it goes through that process, there is no further role for federal district courts. The only role for the federal judiciary is in the courts of appeals.

And then the third argument is they don't satisfy the test for a TRO.

So to start with the first point about exhaustion -THE COURT: That's really a likelihood of success on
the merits point, isn't it?

MR. MARTIN: Exhaustion, we believe, your Honor, is a jurisdictional issue. And it was -- both the --

THE COURT: Let me ask you this. Let me cut to the chase: So imagine Cleantech or any other company finds itself in a battle with NASDAQ. NASDAQ issues its decision. They appeal, as they're supposed to, to the SEC. And at the same time they file that appeal, they also ask for a stay of the delisting. They do it timely. And they just hear nothing from the SEC for 30 days.

At that point what is their remedy?

MR. MARTIN: We believe in that case you would -- that they would then go to the Court of Appeals --

THE COURT: How would they do that? They'd ask the

Court of Appeals for a TRO?

MR. MARTIN: Well, no, your Honor. There is a -Section 78y of The Exchange Act governs review of SEC
decisions. And I think the argument would have to be that
failure to act is tantamount to a decision. And there's an
analogy here to the Administrative Procedure Act, which defines
failure to act as equivalent to agency action.

THE COURT: All right. But it doesn't define what would be a reasonable time, right?

MR. MARTIN: Yes, your Honor. But I would think that in the context of a ten-day provision, ten-day notice period, that there would be an argument for the other side that that is the reasonable time.

THE COURT: Ten days? That's what you're saying. So if they waited more than ten days, you could go to the Court of Appeals; if the SEC waited more than ten days, you could go to the Court of Appeals for a TRO enjoining the SEC from allowing the NASDAQ delisting to go forward?

MR. MARTIN: Well, the argument, your Honor, would be that they should — that the Court of Appeals should deem to be unlawful or arbitrary the SEC's failure to grant the stay.

And, you know, it might be a shorter period than ten days to allow enough time for the Court of Appeals. The point is it's to some extent an artificial inquiry here, because they didn't allow any of this process to play out.

THE COURT: I understand. So the hypothetical I gave, your view is that the SEC would have ten days to act; and if they didn't -- on the stay, ten days to act; and if they did not, then the folks at the front table could go barreling into the circuit?

MR. MARTIN: I think, actually, it's -- as a matter of caution, they would probably want to go to the Second Circuit before that. And the argument would be, in light of all of the arguments they've been making to this court about irreparable injury and the likelihood of success, that the Court of Appeals should act promptly to tell the SEC what to do. And so they might not want to wait until the very end of the ten-day period, but wherever in the ten-day period they fall, they would want to do that to give both the SEC and the Court of Appeals enough time to act.

THE COURT: All right. But at what point in your mind could they go to the Court of Appeals?

MR. MARTIN: Your Honor, I don't know. It's to some extent an issue between the SEC and Cleantech. And without the benefit of the SEC being here, we don't know when the SEC's position would be on this particular issue. NASDAQ wouldn't -- presumably would not be a party to any of this litigation.

THE COURT: Look, the way it works is that generally when I make a ruling, if I really botch it, somebody can go straight to the Court of Appeals on an emergency basis and get

my order stayed, right? They can do that. But the SEC, you don't get to do that. You've got to wait 10 or 20 or 30 days, 60 days.

MR. MARTIN: As I understood the hypothetical, your Honor, you imagined a world which the SEC did absolutely nothing. And it would be a different situation if the SEC denied it, and then you could go immediately up. If the SEC just declined to act, maybe they would follow immediately, maybe they would wait a few days. I think either way, they would want to go on to the Court of Appeals before the ten-day period expired. But I think it would be up to them as a strategic matter how long they waited. But the argument they would make, though, is that the SEC acted arbitrarily in failing even to consider the stay issue.

THE COURT: Well, all right. But, I mean, there's no precedent for that either, is there?

MR. MARTIN: Not to my knowledge, your Honor.

THE COURT: So, I mean, does the SEC routinely grant stays when they're asked?

MR. MARTIN: I don't know about routinely, your Honor. I know that we're aware of precedents where they have granted stays. I don't know as an empirical matter how often they're even asked to grant a stay, so I don't know what percentage of the cases they are asked and what --

THE COURT: And what are the criteria they look to in

deciding whether or not to grant the stay request?

MR. MARTIN: My understanding, your Honor, is it's a similar criteria to what this Court would consider in the Maxim Integrated Products case. They considered the same factors about irreparable harm and likelihood of success on the merits and the public interest and harm to NASDAQ. Tellingly, the SEC rather routinely holds that delisting is not itself an irreparable injury for the simple reason that once a stock is suspended, it gets traded in the over-the-counter market. And the final determinations are to be made, to be taken into account in the stock price.

THE COURT: It's kind of hard to raise capital, right?

MR. MARTIN: I'm not sure, your Honor, how they would

raise capital through NASDAQ in any event. I mean, once

they've been suspended, they get traded in the over-the-counter

market. And the share price could then take into account the

final determination of the listing even before it becomes

effective.

So the SEC has said in the Maxim Integrated Products case, and several other cases cited there, that in the SEC's view, the effectiveness of delisting is not itself irreparable harm.

THE COURT: Well, so what are they looking to to determine irreparable harm, then?

MR. MARTIN: Your Honor, I'm not sure what showing

they would require to establish irreparable harm.

THE COURT: Well, it sounds to me like if they're applying the same criteria that a court would in a TRO setting, irreparable harm is an absolute prerequisite. And so if you can't — if they can't establish irreparable harm, then I would think the SEC would be denying these requests routinely.

MR. MARTIN: In *Maxim*, in fact, the request was denied. And *Maxim* is a rather interesting case, because --

THE COURT: But if you are right, why would the SEC ever grant these? If delisting is not irreparable harm, then there must be either some criteria that the SEC is applying, because they do grant these on occasion, or there must be some other way to establish irreparable harm.

MR. MARTIN: Well, in *Maxim*, what happened is they granted a temporary stay just long enough to have briefing on the stay issue. It might be possible to imagine circumstances where a party could establish irreparable harm. We don't believe that's the case here. But it's possible in extraordinary circumstances that you could conceive of irreparable harm, but just in the ordinary course, the factors delisting, once a -- once NASDAQ has already made a final determination, delisting is not viewed by the SEC as constituting irreparable harm.

THE COURT: Let's stop there.

Mr. Fensterstock, with respect to the jurisdictional

argument that exhaustion is required before you get to run into 1 2 federal court, your response to that is what? 3 MR. FENSTERSTOCK: Sure. I'm a little bewildered, 4 your Honor, because --5 THE COURT: That's the usual case, Mr. Fensterstock. 6 MR. FENSTERSTOCK: You're right, your Honor. And that 7 is the predicament that I find myself in. However --8 THE COURT: But you've rallied before, so let's see 9 what you can do. 10 MR. FENSTERSTOCK: I find it a little peculiar that 11 Mr. Martin can arque that this Court doesn't have jurisdiction. 12 After all, they removed the action to this Court. 13 THE COURT: Yeah. 14 MR. FENSTERSTOCK: And said this Court has 15 jurisdiction. 16 THE COURT: I think what he was saying is that I have 17 jurisdiction to vacate what Judge Schweitzer is doing. I can 18 pick on those guys across the street, but there's not much I 19 can do to the SEC, is I think what he's saying. He's saying I 20 have jurisdiction for the motion to vacate. I don't have 21 jurisdiction for the TRO. 22 Is that what you're saying, Mr. Martin? 23 MR. MARTIN: Yes, your Honor. 24 THE COURT: That's what I thought.

MR. FENSTERSTOCK: Because I haven't seen that in any

1 of their papers.

THE COURT: Well, we haven't really seen a response to your requests for a TRO here, right? I mean, we've talked about it some, but --

MR. FENSTERSTOCK: We've talked about it, and they've had eight days to put in a response before Judge Schweitzer.

They couldn't put in a response before you --

THE COURT: I guess they had a better Christmas than you and I did.

MR. FENSTERSTOCK: I think that's probably right, your Honor. I know they did.

But, you know, on the irreparable harm issue, your Honor, we have showed that. We have shown through Mr. Staloff's affidavit, through Mr. Uchimoto's affidavit --

THE COURT: We're going to get to irreparable harm. Right now I'm addressing what Mr. Martin characterized as a jurisdictional issue that the -- there is an exhaustion requirement. First, you go in to the SEC --

You can come in, gentlemen. You're here for attorney admissions? Have a seat. I've just got another matter.

I'm the Part I judge, so I'm admitting new attorneys today to the district. So that's going to start at 11:00, so we may have to break at that point.

So, anyway, I'm sorry.

MR. FENSTERSTOCK: I think the rule on exhaustion,

your Honor, there's no question, I agree with you that NASDAQ 1 2 properly follows its own rules. The record goes to the SEC. 3 We appeal to the SEC. 4 THE COURT: Right. 5 MR. FENSTERSTOCK: Our point here is NASDAQ did not 6 follow its own rules. NASDAQ will not give us discovery. They 7 won't even give us a copy of the record. Somebody has to intrude on a quasi-governmental agency like NASDAQ. 8 9 THE COURT: But that's SEC. That's the SEC, isn't it? MR. FENSTERSTOCK: No. The SEC has the substantive 10 11 right to rule on the appeal. 12 THE COURT: Right or the obligation? 13 MR. FENSTERSTOCK: Pardon me? 14 THE COURT: It's more than a right, right? 15 MR. FENSTERSTOCK: You're right. They have the 16 obligation. However, we have exhausted the remedy with respect 17 to a stay because --18 THE COURT: Well, as of Friday, you mean? Before 19 Friday you hadn't moved for a stay, or Thursday evening. 20 MR. FENSTERSTOCK: Well, no. Your Honor, wait. 21 That's not true. Because we got a stay --22 THE COURT: No. No, I'm talking about with the SEC. 23 MR. FENSTERSTOCK: That's true, but we had received a

know, that's up to you. But we had received a stay. We didn't

stay from a judge. Whether you think it's valid or not, you

24

have to go to the SEC at that point. 1 2 THE COURT: Maybe we're talking past each other. 3 My point is: If you follow the rules as Mr. Martin 4 interprets them, then you should have appealed to the SEC, 5 moved for a stay before the SEC. And if the SEC then didn't 6 act within a reasonable period of time, you then go in to the 7 Court of Appeals and get your stay that way. 8 MR. FENSTERSTOCK: And there is no case that supports 9 that position. 10 THE COURT: No, but there is certainly the language in 11 the statute and the writings seem to suggest that. Seems to 12 me --13 MR. FENSTERSTOCK: The language in the legislative 14 history says no. It says you can go before a state or federal 15 judge. The remedies you would have in federal or 16 THE COURT: 17 state court, right? I don't know that you ever handed me up the legislative history. I don't think you did. 18 19 MR. FENSTERSTOCK: I don't think I did, your Honor, 20 but we'd be glad to. 21 THE COURT: Do you have it? 22 MR. FENSTERSTOCK: I do. I'm afraid the one I have 23 is --24 THE COURT: All marked up, got your secret code?

MR. FENSTERSTOCK: Well --

THE COURT: Well, just --1 MR. FENSTERSTOCK: All it is is it's underlined. It's 2 3 not marked up. There are no comments or anything. 4 THE COURT: Show it to Mr. Martin, if he's okay with 5 it, and Mr. Hallowell. 6 MR. FENSTERSTOCK: And it's the whole hearing but 7 there's only a couple of pages. I can give you the cite. THE COURT: You said it's the whole hearing? 8 9 MR. FENSTERSTOCK: No -- well, it's the rule -- the 10 final rule making. It is 17, CFR, parts 232, 240 and 249. We 11 can send up a copy as soon as we get out of court, your Honor. 12 THE COURT: Okay. Yeah, I just wanted to make sure 13 that -- I heard what you quoted. I wanted to just sort of see 14 it in context. 15 MR. MARTIN: Your Honor, we would, after we've had the opportunity to review it, want to point out a few other 16 17 portions that are not marked in there. But we have no 18 objection to him submitting a copy. 19 THE COURT: You want to give it to me or wait until 20 later? 21 MR. FENSTERSTOCK: That's fine, your Honor. I'll hand 22 it up. 23 So the point, your Honor, is there is no case that 24 supports their position that we can't come to court.

THE COURT: I'm not aware of sort of a whole lot of

case law generally. It seems to me that the language in the statute talks about the SEC being the place you go to appeal the SRO's decision. And the SEC then has a reasonable period of time to rule. And if you don't like the ruling, then you can go to the Court of Appeals.

You agree with that, right? That's a fair characterization?

MR. FENSTERSTOCK: I agree with that appellate process, correct.

THE COURT: Okay. So why isn't that sufficient? Why isn't that due process good enough for anybody?

MR. FENSTERSTOCK: Because if you suffer immediate and irreparable harm while that process is going on -- and we have been denied due process below at NASDAQ -- there has got to be recourse. Our point is there are a paucity of opinions in this area. Judge Sotomayor in the case often quoted by Mr. Martin said that. There are a paucity of cases.

The point is, your Honor, we have no other recourse at this point. We have applied to the SEC. They may or may not respond, as you said in the hearing the other day. We have done that. If they don't respond, where are we? We have no recourse whatsoever other than this court. Now, that you have — it seems that you are prone to vacate the order by Judge Schweitzer from Supreme New York, but we had recourse, presumably either to him or to you.

THE COURT: Or to the SEC. You have some recourse to the SEC. The SEC can agree. They might agree with you on all these points, right?

MR. FENSTERSTOCK: And if they do, terrific. But how is anybody harmed by your extending the TRO on which we had a full and complete hearing?

THE COURT: Because I think we're mixing apples and oranges at this point. We're talking about an exhaustion requirement. That is the first hurdle before I get to irreparable harm. And so the exhaustion requirement -- I mean, there is some overlap, because the -- to evade the exhaustion requirement, there is a body of case law that says, well, one of the criteria for not exhausting or for being excused for not exhausting is that there is an irreparable harm that's not otherwise going to be provided adequate -- an opportunity for adequate relief, okay. So I think that's why you keep coming back to that. It's plausible.

But I just want to stay on this as exhaustion. And so if this was all done timely, this system would work, wouldn't it? You would have your --

MR. FENSTERSTOCK: Not necessarily.

THE COURT: You don't get it in the SEC, then you get to go to the Court of Appeal. That's the framework that Congress set up, right?

MR. FENSTERSTOCK: No, not necessarily.

THE COURT: Why not?

MR. FENSTERSTOCK: Because let's assume before I got involved in the case, which was last week, let's assume a month ago the company applied for a stay to the SEC.

THE COURT: Right.

MR. FENSTERSTOCK: On December 16th, NASDAQ files their Form 25. On December 26th the final delisting occurs. SEC does nothing. They are delisted. They are done. The SEC could take no action, at which point they're done. What does the company do then? They go to the Circuit Court, or they come back to you and say, we've exhausted our remedies, Judge, but now we're done. We've delisted. The perception out there is we're a no-good company. We're down the tubes. The fact of the matter is the reason we're here is because this ten-day period will expire. The company will be imminently and irreparably harmed, and there is no other recourse.

So the exhaustion of administrative remedies is fine and dandy as a principle of administrative law. But you've got to look at it, as Senator Specter said, from a practical and realistic point of view. The fact of the matter is, where are we right now? Right now we have a TRO in place until you rule that you're going to vacate it.

THE COURT: Right.

MR. FENSTERSTOCK: Let's assume you vacated it right now. Presumably the company -- I don't know what happens. Is

the company delisted while the SEC sits there and maybe does nothing until March and the company is forever doomed, that it's been delisted? That doesn't seem to me to be the proper abstract for the Administrative Procedure Act or the entire parameters of the Securities and Exchange Commission rules.

And you pointed that out last week, when you said, what happens if the SEC doesn't act and we don't have a TRO in place? Mr. Martin stood there and said, Judge, I don't know. I guess that's just tough for Cleantech. Well, that's not justice, your Honor. And they did not follow their rules in this case. They refused to follow their rules. Even in their opposition to our stay before NASDAQ, they're very cute when they say the board did not review the decision. In our view each member of the board had to have the opportunity to review the decision. They did not follow the rules.

THE COURT: That's the basis of your appeal to the SEC?

MR. FENSTERSTOCK: Correct.

THE COURT: What is now before the SEC that is I think of particular moment is the request for a stay, which they clearly have the authority to grant, which is the equivalent of the TRO you're seeking here. And it seems to me that if -- in the hypothetical you just posed, if you moved timely and immediately for a stay, and either they denied the stay or they didn't act at all, then it would seem to me that the recourse

would be in the Court of Appeals to give you the relief that they either didn't give or erroneously denied. And that strikes me as a very effective process for dealing with this. That's certainly the process that was contemplated by Congress when it passed The Exchange Act.

MR. FENSTERSTOCK: Congress never said in passing The Exchange Act or in the final rule making that you had to exhaust your procedural remedies for intermediate relief by going to the SEC rather than coming into court. I don't think you're going to find that anywhere in the Securities and Exchange Act. I don't think you're going to find that anywhere that they said that procedural mechanism — which is what courts are for, it seems to me, to grant immediate relief, when necessary, to toll irreparable harm. That's what we're here for.

THE COURT: Well, I mean, I'm looking at the statute, 78y(c)(1). No objection to an order or rule of the commission for which review is sought under this section may be considered by the Court unless it was urged before the commission or there was a reasonable ground for failure to do so. So is that an applicable provision or not? It's a rule of the commission, but its order or rule of the commission is the commission's issuance of an order denying the request for a stay or failing to issue an order subject to that provision?

MR. FENSTERSTOCK: Your Honor, I don't have that

provision in front of me. I apologize.

THE COURT: That's all right. Well, it's Title 15, United States Code, 78y, and then it is (c)(1), and then (c)(2) talks about the stay. You know, that's the stay provision.

So, well, let me suggest this: I have attorney admissions that I want to do. In the meantime, it might make sense to reach out to the SEC to see if they've now had time to digest what was lobbed over to them on Friday. And maybe they've issued a stay since we've been here, in which case this whole thing is moot.

So do you want to follow up with that, and we'll come back here in an hour's time? I hate to have you sort of just spinning your wheels or cooling your jets, whatever.

MR. FENSTERSTOCK: There is no place we'd rather be, your Honor. We'd be delighted to do that.

THE COURT: I'm flattered, Mr. Fensterstock.

So let's come back in an hour, and hopefully you can give me an update on the SEC, and then we'll resume the argument then.

Thanks for your patience. I appreciate it. (Recess)

THE COURT: Thanks for your patience. New attorney admissions are once a week, and they're actually very inspiring. I do enjoy them. Mr. Fensterstock had the opportunity to move for the admission -- was it for you,

Eugene -- Mr. Kublanovsky a couple years ago, and they really are one of the best things of being a judge, I have to say. An adversarial system, I think, works. I do think that there's something about having good lawyers like I have here today who can duke it out and a judge who gets to be the sort of the net, the unbiased net in the match.

But there's something nice once in a while to having a nonadversarial setting, where you have just an occasion to celebrate the admission of new, young talent. So I hope you still remember it, Mr. Kublanovsky.

MR. KUBLANOVSKY: I remember it well.

THE COURT: I do, too. They are memorable occasions.

The only thing that tops it, honestly, are new citizens, which

I get to do on Friday. That's an inspiring setting, if you

haven't seen it.

So all right. Let's get back to this adversarial proceeding. Any news since we last spoke?

MR. FENSTERSTOCK: Yes, your Honor.

We endeavored to call the SEC. We spoke -- actually, one of Ms. Shaffner's associates spoke with Elizabeth Murphy, Secretary of the SEC, and Joan Loizeaux, L-O-I-Z-E-A-U-X, associate general counsel for adjudication. Josh Dutill, Ms. Shaffner's associate, was told that something in the next day or so on the stay will be issued by the SEC.

THE COURT: Okay. Something in the next day or so?

MR. FENSTERSTOCK: In the next day or so.

THE COURT: That's pretty quick, considering they got it Friday and it's a holiday week, and I'm sure everybody is short staffed. So that's not too bad. But for our purposes, a little more definite would be nice. All right.

MR. FENSTERSTOCK: There are a couple of points I'd like to make, your Honor, in addition to what we discussed this morning.

One, as we stated in our papers, both before Judge Schweitzer and before you, we believe this case falls within the exception of exhaustion of administrative remedies.

THE COURT: Well, the Second Circuit has recognized that there's four or five things that they point to that courts should look to to decide whether exhaustion has been -- should be excused.

MR. FENSTERSTOCK: Agreed.

Two, in this case we're in an enigma, because NASDAQ has said that we cannot get discovery before the SEC. So even if the SEC comes back and rules on our stay motion, we cannot get complete relief from the SEC. So there is no remedy to exhaust, because we have asked both for a TRO and expedited discovery.

Three --

THE COURT: When did you ask for expedited discovery, just Friday?

1 MR. FENSTERSTOCK: Yes.
2 THE COURT: First time?
3 MR. FENSTERSTOCK: Yes.
4 THE COURT: Well, when y

THE COURT: Well, when you appealed the November decision of NASDAQ to the SEC, did you seek any additional discovery at that time?

MS. SHAFFNER: No, your Honor. I don't believe there is any provision for discovery at the SEC. It was really at the suggestion of your Honor to approach the SEC for both the stay and the relief that we had in the state court and were seeking before this Court that we made the request. NASDAQ in its response acknowledged that there is no provision for discovery before the SEC. And those are discovery on the due process issues that were raised originally.

THE COURT: All right. Well, I mean, I guess I'll hear from Mr. Martin, I presume, on that in a moment.

But just so we're clear, I think the Second Circuit has identified four factors to be considered in deciding whether or not the requirement of exhaustion of administrative remedies should be waived: First, that the available remedies provide no genuine opportunity for adequate relief; second, that irreparable injury may occur without immediate judicial relief; three, administrative appeal will be futile; or four, the plaintiff has raised a substantial constitutional question.

So we've been talking a lot about some of these. I

mean, the first relating to no genuine opportunity for adequate relief. I'm not sure that's even being argued. I think certainly the SEC could give all the relief that plaintiffs are asking here.

Second factor, irreparable injury that may occur without immediate judicial relief, is a point that has been argued at some length. I mean, there is some question in my mind as to whether or not irreparable harm really would follow. This is a company that's been suspended for some time, so it's not clear to me what delisting will actually do that the suspension or the decision of NASDAQ in November didn't already do. But we'll talk to that.

Administrative appeal will be futile. I don't think there's been a suggestion that it would be futile at this point.

And that the plaintiff has raised a substantial constitutional question, I don't think you've articulated a substantial constitutional question. Have you,

Mr. Fensterstock?

MR. FENSTERSTOCK: Well, I tried to. Maybe I didn't do it right.

THE COURT: Just sort of general due process?

MR. FENSTERSTOCK: Yes.

THE COURT: All right.

MR. FENSTERSTOCK: And the due process argument, your

Honor, it seems to me, is amplified by NASDAQ's position that we can't even get a copy of the record. I don't know how you have any sort of appeal, any sort of due process without getting a copy of the record. I mean, to me, that's just outrageous. I don't see how that can be due process.

THE COURT: What is the record you're referring to?

MR. FENSTERSTOCK: There is a certified record, as I

understand it -- Ms. Shaffner can speak to this better.

There's a certified record of letters, correspondence, e-mails,
everything that happened before NASDAQ that goes up to the SEC,
just like if we were going from the district court to the

Circuit Court. There are a bunch of things in that record, and
Ms. Shaffner's firm listed, I don't know, 25, 20 of them, that
we don't have a copy of, apparently. NASDAQ took the position
in an e-mail that they have no obligation to give it to us and

THE COURT: But they have to give it to the SEC if the SEC required it, correct?

MR. FENSTERSTOCK: It's a certified record that is, I assume, sent up to the SEC. So the SEC must have it.

MS. SHAFFNER: Yes.

they're not going to give it to us.

MR. FENSTERSTOCK: Yes.

THE COURT: All right. So if you were to request it to the SEC, then the SEC might have a different answer than NASDAQ has, correct?

MR. FENSTERSTOCK: Presumably that's correct. 1 2 THE COURT: Have you made a request to the SEC to get these materials? 3 4 MR. FENSTERSTOCK: They just denied it on Friday 5 night. 6 MS. SHAFFNER: We're making a request, your Honor, 7 today to the SEC. THE COURT: So NASDAQ denied it on Friday night. 8 9 You're making a request to the SEC. I think at this point 10 probably the SEC is the person you should be addressing, the 11 entity you should be addressing. All right. 12 MR. FENSTERSTOCK: My third point, your Honor, is I 13 went back and looked at 15, U.S.C., Section 78y. 14 THE COURT: Let me just find it. Hold on a second. 15 Okay. MR. FENSTERSTOCK: And I may be reading this wrong, 16 17 but to me it says a person aggrieved by a final order of the commission --18 19 THE COURT: Where are you reading? 20 MR. FENSTERSTOCK: 78y(a)(1). A person aggrieved by a 21 final order of the commission entered pursuant to this chapter 22 may obtain review. 23 THE COURT: Right. MR. FENSTERSTOCK: And the Court of Appeals --24 25 THE COURT: Yeah.

MR. FENSTERSTOCK: As far as I can tell, a motion for a stay is not a final order. And I don't believe there is a case that says a stay is a final order appealable to the Second Circuit or to a Circuit Court. So we do not have any avenue, assuming the SEC, whatever they do — deny a stay, don't rule on a stay, whatever — we don't believe that's appealable.

THE COURT: You don't believe that is appealable?

MR. FENSTERSTOCK: It's my understanding that a stay is not a final order. I cannot find, in the hour that we looked, any case which says that a stay issued or a refusal to issue a stay is a final order which can be appealed. So, therefore, we have no remedy. And that's another reason why justice requires, and there can be no harm by the extension of the TRO, which we have in effect pending a hearing on a preliminary injunction.

There are also cases, Judge, besides the exception to the exhaustion, there are cases which say that you can exhaust your administrative remedies by giving the administrative agency a chance to discover and correct its own errors. We have --

THE COURT: That's the SEC you're referring to?

MR. FENSTERSTOCK: No. I'm referring to the NASDAQ.

THE COURT: NASDAO.

MR. FENSTERSTOCK: We have written to NASDAQ --

THE COURT: I'm not sure -- the administrative agency,

or they're the SRO?

MR. FENSTERSTOCK: Well, they're the SRO. I believe they're a --

THE COURT: I wouldn't think that they would fall under the header of administrative agency, but I could be wrong.

MR. FENSTERSTOCK: I may be wrong on that, but that's my understanding, your Honor.

We also believe, your Honor, that from a practical standpoint, if the TRO is extended, the status quo, assuming there is a TRO in place, which I think there is until you vacate it, will be preserved, which will lead to a -- hopefully lead to a conversation with NASDAQ, which hopefully will lead NASDAQ to understand that we would like a hearing before the board of NASDAQ so that we have a full record before we go to the SEC. And, therefore, the preservation of the status quo will -- justice will be served by extending the status quo. We'll be able to resolve the problems. We'll save judicial time and we'll be able to move on.

And lastly, your Honor, on the issue of irreparable harm, we do have an understanding that should the TRO not be extended, and should the status quo not be preserved, and should we be delisted, the equity bridge financing that the company is working on, has had it going on for some time, there have been discussions by the equity bridge financiers that if

we are delisted, that financing will go away. If that financing potentially goes away — and I can't say one way or the other how the investment bankers are going to react to this — but they have said that if you are delisted, if the TRO is set aside, it is likely we will walk away from the table. If the bridge financing goes away, there are going to be problems in the company. There's no question about it.

So all in all, your Honor, we're here for justice. And we're here to preserve the status quo. Whether or not the company timely applied to the SEC, that's a question for, it seems to me, another day. They did get a TRO. Whether it was valid or not, that's for you to decide, I guess. But barring anything else occurring, the company will be delisted, unless there is a stay. And we don't know what's going to happen before the SEC, so I think a TRO should be granted.

There is irreparable harm. We believe we have raised a constitutional issue of due process. And NASDAQ following their own rules, I agree that we will -- we're appealing that before the SEC. But in the interim, if the company is delisted, and there is no stay, the company is harmed. And I think we've shown that. And there have been no affidavits in opposition to our showing.

THE COURT: All right. But Judge Koeltl -- I'm not sure if you're familiar with his decision in American Benefits Group, Inc. v. National Association of Securities Dealers.

It's a 1999 case, distinguishable. It's not dealing with the exact same thing here. But he does state -- and it's not binding on me. He's just a district court judge like me.

But in dealing with exhaustion, he talks about irreparable harm and states, quote, economic harm suffered by companies as a result of NASD regulatory actions, including delisting for failure to file proper forms, does not constitute irreparable harm for purposes of circumventing the exhaustion requirement. Then he cites the *Belfort* decision and a couple of other decisions, including a Third Circuit decision.

So, I mean, there is some precedent for saying that delisting alone is not irreparable harm, even if it will have economic consequences.

MR. FENSTERSTOCK: I'm familiar with Judge Koeltl, and I'm familiar with the National Association of Securities

Dealers and American Benefits case. That case had to do with delisting for failure to file a proper form. It did not have to do with delisting because of a potential constitutional due process of discriminatory actions.

Also in that case Judge Koeltl said notions of administrative autonomy require that the agency be given a chance to discover and correct its own errors, a practice that will protect the integrity, etc. And that's what I was referencing when you said you thought it was the SEC. Well, you may be right. I thought --

THE COURT: This is about -- I mean, that case is not about delisting. That case is about a rule, I believe.

MR. FENSTERSTOCK: Correct, and filing the proper forms, I believe that's correct. And that was to prevent the implementation of new NASD rules. I think that's what that case was about.

And they also -- it was an argument there about sovereign immunity, which we're not arguing, because nobody -- in our case we're not calling for liability. We agree there's sovereign immunity. We're not talking about liability. We're not talking about an injunction or a stay.

THE COURT: Okay. Mr. Martin, let's hear you with respect to exhaustion first, and then I guess irreparable harm is a component of exhaustion analysis and a TRO, if we get there.

MR. MARTIN: Sure. I'd like briefly just to address the constitutional point, substantial constitutional claim and then touch on irreparable harm.

Just briefly, on the constitutional claim, so there are about a dozen cases from the Second Circuit saying that SROs like NASDAQ are not state actors; that, therefore, there is not only not a substantial constitutional claim, there is not even a colorable constitutional claim, all these facts. So we don't think that exception is applicable here.

So turning to the irreparable injury issue, it was an interesting point, quoting from American Benefits Group, that same reasoning has been picked up in any number of cases, including First Jersey Securities. The point they make in First Jersey, 605 F.2d at 697, is that any company threatened by an NASD hearing could run in to district court claiming that the imposition of sanctions would result in irreparable injury. That's the same thing that's going on here. It's the same thing that happened in the Belfort decision in this court. It's the same thing that happened in the Dimensional Visions in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania. It's the same thing happened in the other circuits, including Swirsky in the First Circuit.

Whenever an SRO like NASDAQ takes action against a company, the company could run in to court saying that there would be irreparable injury unless the action was stopped. Courts routinely reject those arguments. We're not aware of any courts ever stepping in to stop a delisting proceeding. And the reason is that the same sorts of arguments they're making here could be made anytime there's a delisting. And, therefore, if this Court were to accept those arguments as justifying a stay here, it would create, in effect, a blueprint to derail any NASDAQ delisting process. In our view, the proper way to proceed in these cases is to go through the procedures that Congress enacted.

THE COURT: So let's go there. I mean, what

Mr. Fensterstock just suggested is that his reading of 78y is

that it's only a final order of the commission that is entitled

to review by the Circuit Court, and so a denial of a motion —

or a request to stay is not something that would be appealable.

Do you agree with that?

MR. MARTIN: I don't believe I do. I think it turns on what finality means here. I agree with him that I'm not aware of any case law on the issue, but it seems to me you can draw by analogy to the Administrative Procedure Act. And on that, the finality would stem from the fact that it is indeed the final agency — the denial of a stay is indeed the final agency action on the stay request.

And so I'm not sure why they would arbitrarily cut off their ability to go to the Court of Appeals here. I would think that they would be of the view they should be able to get Court of Appeals review, particularly since they've taken every procedural opportunity available to them, and many that are not, to go to state court. I don't know why they would simultaneously turn around and argue that they can't get review by the Court of Appeals.

But in any event I do believe that under traditional finality principles, they would have the argument that the denial of a stay is a final agency action.

We can also look to the APA's definition of agency

action itself. The APA, and I believe this is in Section 706 -- maybe I'm misremembering that -- but it defines agency action to include failure to act. So Congress enacted the APA, understood that agency action sometimes comes in the form of inaction. And that is the sort of thing that can be reviewed in this case by a Court of Appeals. Therefore, we believe that they have not yet exhausted.

And, you know, one other point. They have been talking about exhaustion, administrative remedies, and to some extent in this context that's a misnomer. If you look at the *Swirsky* decision out of the First Circuit, *Swirsky* says you have to go through the entire exchange action process, including SEC review, and then, if applicable, review at the Court of Appeals.

And so you have to exhaust all of the layers of the process. In our view there are six layers here, four of which are at NASDAQ. They've gone through those, but there's also SEC review and Court of Appeals review. And until they've gone through all those steps, in our view they haven't exhausted.

But even if we assume -- and again, we disagree with this, but if we assume they have exhausted, there are still an issue about whether they can go to federal district court to get relief. And that's where the decision in *Series* 7 out of the DC circuit comes in. *Series* 7 says when Congress enacted this comprehensive scheme of regulation, it intended to channel

all review of SRO activity through that comprehensive scheme and not to allow parties to subvert the scheme by going into federal district court. And that's relevant here for a fairly significant reason: They've asserted claims under The Exchange Act under Section 19g.

In the Fiennes case out of the Second Circuit, the Second Circuit said, in light of the comprehensive review scheme provided by Congress, there is no private right of action to enforce The Exchange Act against SROs. Now they've also asserted state law claims. The Second Circuit, applying Fiennes and Desiderio, said, and that comprehensive system also forecloses state law claims.

And so when we get to, you know, likelihood of success on the merits, we believe that the comprehensive review scheme adopted by Congress precludes them from going to court, either under exchange act claims or under state law claims, to seek this review.

THE COURT: Wait. Precludes them from going to court?

MR. MARTIN: Federal district court; that they still
have review available in the Court of Appeals. So the exchange
act claim is out, because there's no private right of action.

The state law claims are out because they are precluded in
light of the comprehensive review scheme.

That leaves the federal constitutional claim. And for that, the Second Circuit case law was clear. In fact, they

call it -- I have it here. The precedent is clear that NASD -- at the time it was NASD -- is not a state actor.

And, therefore, if you turn to the likelihood of success on the merits claim, prong of the TRO analysis, there is no claim that they have advanced in which they can establish any likelihood of success on the merits.

So for that reason, even if you get past the jurisdictional issue of exhaustion, we don't think they can establish likelihood of success on the merits.

THE COURT: But just so I'm clear, I mean, if it were, in fact, an allegation that NASD was systematically delisting companies that were owned by women or owned by African-Americans, there is no way they can — they don't get any court assessment of that claim?

MR. MARTIN: Well, they get SEC review, followed by review in Court of Appeals. What they don't get is a federal constitutional claim that requires action by the government. The cases are clear. I can cite this Court to about a half dozen of them saying that SROs like NASDAQ are not state actors and, therefore, there's no state constitutional claim.

One particularly telling example was a case called *DL Capital*, which involved an investigation conducted jointly by the SEC and NASD. They divided the claim, the defendants, between the two against the SEC. There was a Fifth Amendment claim asserted for privilege from testifying against oneself.

The Second Circuit didn't allow a comparable claim against NASD because NASD was not a state actor.

And there are other cases as well. Berger v. SEC,
Second Circuit from 2009, says, we have held that NASD is not a
state actor subject to due process requirements. That picks up
a footnote on DeLessio, also from 2009, saying that NASD, which
they had analyzed in New York Stock Exchange in that case, is
not a state actor subject to due process requirements.

@Perpetual Circuits Inc. vs. Tang, it is clear and unambiguous
precedent in this circuit holding that NASD is a private actor.
Desiderio from 1999 says NASD is not required to act as a state
actor.

So if you get to these constitutional claims, there's no colorable argument that the due process clause would constrain SRO activity. The way to challenge that is, again, to go through the process that Congress created to the SEC.

THE COURT: And just the standard would simply be arbitrary and capricious, and presumably, then, a race-based or gender-based policy on the part of the SRO would be arbitrary and capricious?

MR. MARTIN: I think we can agree that if, in fact, an SRO were engaged in racial discrimination — and we do not believe that to be the case here, of course — but if that were true, then we would — the SEC could properly set aside an SRO action on that ground. Now, again, we don't believe that's the

case here. We think that issue can be raised and addressed in the SEC proceedings.

But there's no constitutional claim. And under Fiennes and Desiderio in the Second Circuit and Series 7 in the DC circuit, we also believe they can't proceed with The Exchange Act claims or state law claims raising some argument.

THE COURT: Just to go back to what you started with, your view is that if the SEC were to issue a ruling today that says your request for a stay is denied, that plaintiffs then could go running to the Second Circuit or the DC circuit and seek to have that denial reviewed?

MR. MARTIN: Yes, your Honor, I believe that to be so.

THE COURT: What would be the standard of review for that proceeding?

MR. MARTIN: Well, actually, I misspoke on the Second Circuit. It's not clear to me that they actually could go to the Second Circuit. I believe they're incorporated in Nevada, so they might need to go to the Ninth Circuit.

THE COURT: I just assumed they had their principal place of business here, but that's not true?

MR. MARTIN: I believe it's a Nevada corporation, with its principal place of business in China. So it might be that the place of review would be the Ninth Circuit or the DC circuit. But whichever Court of Appeals would be the appropriate venue for the challenge, they would have the

argument that the denial of a stay is the agency's final action on that request. And their only argument is just to conflate the state issue with the underlying merits.

THE COURT: All right. But so the standard, then, that the Court of Appeals would be applying is what?

MR. MARTIN: I believe it would be substantial evidence for factual findings. And then, I suspect -- I don't know it's for certain, but I suspect something equivalent to the arbitrary and capricious review under the APA.

THE COURT: For the denial of the stay?

MR. MARTIN: I don't know that there's any case law on this, your Honor. And I suppose it would be up to them if they wanted to argue for a different standard. But traditionally these sorts of agency decisions would be reviewed under the arbitrary and capricious standard or contrary to law.

THE COURT: All right. Well, let's all put our practical hats on, then. If the SEC is going to issue something in the next day or so, should we just wait for them to do it?

MR. MARTIN: Your Honor, we don't believe so, for a few reasons. The first, as we've discussed, we don't believe there's jurisdiction at all.

The second, we don't believe there is a likelihood of success on the merits that would justify even a TRO.

And then the third -- we haven't touched on this

yet -- is that this is a claim involving alleged racial discrimination in which NASD's entire board is named as individuals. And so for this Court to issue a TRO in effect saying that they've satisfied the standards for TRO, which includes at least some demonstration of likelihood of success on the merits, in raising claims of racial discrimination against individual board members, we think, would be quite harmful both to NASDAQ and to the individual board members.

THE COURT: In other words, it would be harmful to them because it's a scurrilous allegation, is that what you mean?

MR. MARTIN: Well, yes, because it would be this Court issuing an order that embodies at least some judgment about the plausibility of their claims that NASDAQ's board members engaged in racial animus. And we believe for that reason it's important closely to scrutinize whether they've satisfied each of the requirements for a TRO before issuing anything. And we don't believe that they have satisfied those.

So even as a practical concern, we think that the consequences of issuing a TRO would be sufficiently weighty that it's not just an issue of sitting by for two days. The Court should go through all of the factors bearing on the TRO. And we believe that applying those factors, no TRO would be warranted.

THE COURT: Well, I mean, what's going to happen in

the interim with the delisting? Nothing's going forward, right now, right, until I vacate the state order. There is going to be no delisting; is that what you're saying?

MR. MARTIN: I believe that to be the case, your Honor. Frankly, I'm not sure that there is anything left for NASDAQ to do once it has submitted the Form 25.

THE COURT: That's my question. So whether or not the order is vacated, what does that mean as a practical matter?

MR. MARTIN: Well, as a practical matter, the issue is whether you have a TRO outstanding that at least embodies --

THE COURT: I mean, what happens with respect to the delisting? So is there some list where delisted companies go? Is there some website that says, the following companies have been delisted, that won't have Cleantech on it unless the order is vacated?

MR. MARTIN: My understanding, your Honor, is that the only thing out there is a website that lists companies that are pending for delisting, and that it would -- Cleantech would be removed from the pending list, but that there would be no further action taken by NASDAQ.

But I think it would be helpful here to separate the issue of whether to vacate the state court TRO from whether to grant a new TRO. And the question of whether to grant -- to vacate the state court TRO, it seems to me, turns just on a jurisdictional question that this Court can address as a matter

of law now. And then there's the separate issue whether to exercise this Court's judicial power to issue a new TRO. And we don't think that they've satisfied the requirements for that.

THE COURT: I understand that. I'm just asking, what happens as a practical matter if I were to vacate the state order and deny the request for a TRO here?

MR. MARTIN: My understanding, your Honor, is the only thing that would happen is that NASDAQ would remove Cleantech from the list of pending delisting. There's just a web page that they maintain. But beyond that, there would be no practical effect. It's our understanding that it's now in front of the SEC.

THE COURT: All right. Mr. Fensterstock do you agree with that or disagree with that?

MR. FENSTERSTOCK: Well, it's my understanding -- I agree and disagree. It's my understanding that Cleantech -- that NASDAQ will, as you suggested, remove Cleantech from the pending delisting. And it's like going to the university club and having your membership crossed out --

THE COURT: Is this an analogy you think I'm going to get?

MR. FENSTERSTOCK: Yes. I don't know. Maybe.

THE COURT: No, I can assure you. Specter knows because he didn't give me a pay raise. I'm joking, of course.

MR. FENSTERSTOCK: Obviously if you are -- Mr. Martin argues out of both sides of his mouth. He says NASDAQ is not going to do anything, then he says, oh, yes. What they're going to do is they're going to take Cleantech off of the pending delisting list, or they're going to cross them out and now they're delisted. If that's not action taken by NASDAQ, I don't know what it is. It's like being admitted to a school and then crossing your name out. You're not admitted anymore. That's not an action? That is an action.

THE COURT: I guess it's sort of like being suspended from a school as opposed to being expelled from a school, right?

MR. FENSTERSTOCK: I have to think about that.

THE COURT: Well, I would think that's a pretty good analogy.

MR. FENSTERSTOCK: It's probably pretty good. And obviously being expelled is a lot worse — exactly, it's a lot worse than being suspended. Because you're expelled, you got to do something to come back in. You're suspended, presumably it's just for a short period of time. And I think you answered the question. That is harm. They are doing something. They're denying they're going to do something, but they're going to do it.

THE COURT: Well, I mean, I guess the issue is, what is the effect of a delisting? I mean, you have an affidavit

from somebody who says it's going to affect them financially.

I mean, I think there is some authority that says that that's not enough to establish irreparable harm.

And one of the other arguments you make in your papers is that delisting, followed by a reversal, is still going to require your client to sort of start all over and to get listed. And that doesn't strike me as correct, but I don't have any real knowledge on this. But it would seem to me that a Court -- if the Court of Appeals or the SEC or whoever, if the SEC denied the stay and then a week later said, but we are agreeing with you on the merits and so we're ordering that Cleantech be listed again, I mean, is it your view that Cleantech would have to start all over, as though it had never been listed before?

MR. FENSTERSTOCK: My view is the SEC would reverse.

NASDAQ could then say, wait a second, you're a China-based company. We want to take look at you a little closer. Just like they did the last time. We're going to put you to different tests. And because of what they've done in the past, because of their pattern of discriminatory behavior, I agree that, yes, they would put them to a different test from any other company that's not a China based company which was created by a reverse merger situation.

You brought up a very good point last week. You said, well, if I said -- if I, the judge, said, no, you have to let

them back in the way they were before, that's something. But NASDAQ can apply their rules.

What we have here is it's beyond an SEC rule. It's beyond a NASDAQ rule. It's NASDAQ's discriminatory application of the rules. That is actionable. And that is what — that is why we need a stay, because it's our position that they have discriminatorily applied their rules and interpreted their rules in order to give closer scrutiny to China-based companies. And we have pretty good evidence of that. That's our argument.

Their argument that there is no irreparable harm, we believe — he says there's no irreparable harm. We believe they haven't shown likelihood of success. They don't have any affidavits. They have no proof. We do have some —

THE COURT: They have some law on their side, right?

They have Judge Koeltl and they have, I guess, Justice

Sotomayor.

 $$\operatorname{MR.}$ FENSTERSTOCK: That was not in the context of an application for a stay of delisting.

THE COURT: No, but it's an irreparable harm argument. It still says that delisting does not equal irreparable harm.

MR. FENSTERSTOCK: Generically. In this situation we have some evidence in the record, we think substantial evidence in the record, and they have none to refute it.

THE COURT: Though, I mean, I think the cases that

they cite are cases in which there are comparable allegations of harm that would befall the delisted company. And the courts were unmoved, saying that isn't irreparable harm. I mean, all of them are slightly distinguishable, but there is certainly some authority for saying that delisting, even if it carries with it economic harm, does not constitute irreparable harm, at least for purposes of exhaustion.

I mean, I think it would probably be the same analysis under a TRO or preliminary injunction standard. I don't think irreparable harm would be different from one than it is in the other, but I haven't really focused on that.

MR. FENSTERSTOCK: It's hard to know from these cases, your Honor, what evidence was before the judge. You have two affidavits that are unrefuted.

THE COURT: All right. Mr. Martin, do you want to refute any of these affidavits?

MR. MARTIN: Well, I'd like to begin, your Honor, by emphasizing that it is, of course, their burden here.

On the points made in the affidavit, I think we've touched largely on what is wrong with them. And the first issue is they assume that there would be no remedy if the SEC ultimately were to disagree with the delisting determination made by NASDAQ. And that's wrong. NASDAQ, in fact, in its opposition to the stay motion in the SEC acknowledged that it would be within the SEC's authority to order reinstatement, or

order relisting, rather. And so to the extent that the affidavits turn on an assertion of irreparable harm based on needing to go through the entire listing process anew, that's just inaccurate.

As for the remaining allegations of irreparable harm, there is a vague assertion that some covenants might be tied to whether it's a listed company or not. But those aren't borne out by specific factual allegations of any sort. It's just, you know, any covenants that depend on listing status might be affected. You know, they don't purport to identify specific covenants that might be affected, so we don't believe that would be sufficient.

THE COURT: Well, I think you're talking about Mr. Uchimoto's affidavit at paragraph 8, final delisting will also have a deleterious effect on any covenants, indenture or agreements requiring the company to remain in the status of a listed company. Is there something else?

MR. MARTIN: Yes, your Honor. That was the paragraph that I was talking about. They say that to be so for any covenants, but then they don't identify any actual covenants that might be implicated and, of course, that would be economic harm if it's been deemed insufficient in any other number of cases.

So paragraph seven of that same affidavit, talking about materially more difficult, if not impossible for the

company once they begin to become listed, again, that depends on the assumption that the SEC would not be empowered to grant relief.

THE COURT: Or the Court of Appeals.

MR. MARTIN: Either the SEC or the Court of Appeals on review from the SEC. The previous paragraph about significant adverse effects on the company's common stock, again, this touches on the point that your Honor was discussing about the distinction between suspension and delisting. They have been suspended, which means the stock is now trading in the over-the-counter market, and any effect of the delisting could already have been taken into account in the price once NASDAQ announced publicly that they'd made a final determination of delisting. That's publicly available information.

Elsewhere in their papers they acknowledge that it's had an effect on the stock price, and so they would have to posit some additional harm from the effectiveness of delisting that wouldn't be applicable from the delisting determination itself. And that's not here.

THE COURT: Well, does delisting have any effect on the over-the-counter market? Is it going to be different?

MR. MARTIN: My understanding is that either way, once it's suspended, it gets traded in the over-the-counter market.

THE COURT: And delisting won't change that further?

MR. MARTIN: I've spoken with the client, and they

believe that it will continue to be traded in the over-the-counter market, whether the status is suspended or delisted.

THE COURT: All right. Mr. Fensterstock, is there anything else in the record you're pointing to? It is sort of a vague statement in paragraph eight of Mr. Uchimoto's affidavit.

MR. FENSTERSTOCK: Yes, your Honor. I don't know if you have it before you now, but it's part of the record from the Supreme Court; the affidavit of Arnold Staloff in support.

THE COURT: Yep. What paragraph?

MR. FENSTERSTOCK: It starts in paragraph six.

THE COURT: Well, this is talking about the things that Senator Specter referenced before, which is the leads to the New Jersey Atlantic City project. But that's already happened, right? That's water under the bridge.

MR. FENSTERSTOCK: Yeah, there is a future one for \$100 million as well. And there is also the -- what I discussed earlier about this \$20 million bridge financing.

THE COURT: Where is that?

MR. FENSTERSTOCK: The \$100 million --

THE COURT: Where is the bridge financing? I know the hundred million dollars is paragraph nine.

MR. FENSTERSTOCK: The bridge financing, your Honor, I was told about during the break. It is not in the affidavit.

THE COURT: Okay. Is there anything else in the record before me that relates to the harm that would flow from delisting as opposed to the suspension that's currently in place? I assume a suspension, if I granted you the relief you're seeking and stayed the delisting, you'd still be ineligible for the hundred million dollar New Jersey project, right? You'd still be suspended, you, Cleantech, right?

MR. FENSTERSTOCK: I'm sorry. Could you repeat that, your Honor.

THE COURT: Well, paragraph nine says the decision to delist eliminated Cleantech's opportunity to bid on the New Jersey Atlantic City project, which involves a construction of six wind towers, a contract order of 8.4 million and a follow-up project totaling almost 100 million. As written, this doesn't suggest that the relief you're seeking, the stay, would entitle your client to apply for these things. So it's a little unclear to me as to what exactly is the effect of delisting.

MR. FENSTERSTOCK: I think as written, you are correct, your Honor. I think, although not written as well as it could have been, these are examples. And when the NASDAQ actually takes the pen and crosses out Cleantech, any hope for any of these projects will be gone.

THE COURT: I mean, when we're focusing on what's going to happen now, if the stay is granted or if the TRO is

not lifted -- excuse me. Let me rephrase that.

If the TRO were vacated and the SEC did not grant the stay request, what would happen? How would the status quo as it exists now change? And there's not a whole lot in Mr. Staloff's declaration or affidavit that goes to that. He says, somewhat generally, the impact of NASDAQ's decision to delist has been severe. If NASDAQ's decision takes effect before the SEC issues its decision on Cleantech's appeal, the impact will be even more profound, potentially resolving in insolvency. In my experience the delisting of a company often drives the company rapidly into a state of insolvency and dissolution. Paragraph 15 and 16.

MR. FENSTERSTOCK: Right 15, 16, 17, 18.

THE COURT: I mean, that's somewhat conclusory. Do you agree?

MR. FENSTERSTOCK: Well, I agree that 15, 16, 17 and 18 are Mr. Staloff's opinion about what will happen if we do not get a stay. And it seems to me that he is using the previous examples as really exemplary of the further catastrophic impact of the delisting. And it could have been written better, clearly, but it says what it says.

THE COURT: But, I mean, the announcement of a delisting was made over a month ago, right, that it's going to happen?

MR. FENSTERSTOCK: Correct.

THE COURT: All right. And so -- and the suspension was in place since March, I think, right?

MR. FENSTERSTOCK: Correct.

THE COURT: So it's not clear to me what is going to happen now if this delisting shoe drops that's any different than what is currently happening.

MR. FENSTERSTOCK: To take your analogy, your Honor, if a high school decides to suspend somebody and says, we're going to suspend you, or a high school decides to kick somebody out and they say, we're going to kick you out, obviously there are different impacts, practical impact.

Same here. It is perception of the company. They are traded over the counter, that's true, and they're going to continue. And this is why there is no harm on the NASDAQ side at all — when you balance the hardships, there is no harm in extending the TRO. Nobody, absolutely nobody, can be harmed. And I'll put it to Mr. Martin to tell you what harm can happen to anybody.

On the other hand, the perception that a company has been suspended or expelled have different perceptual harms in the marketplace. And in the economic -- especially in this economy --

THE COURT: I'm taking your word for that? It would seem to me if they've been suspended since March and the delisting has been announced since November, it would seem to

me the marketplace has already adjusted to this information. The fact that there's been sort of a stay doesn't mean that anybody's assessment of the future prospects of the company is going to be that much different.

MR. FENSTERSTOCK: You don't have to take my word for it. Mr. Staloff, I think, brings his 40 years in the financial industry to bear on this issue.

THE COURT: But just with the statement that in my experience, delisting has severe implications, that? You're referring to paragraph --

MR. FENSTERSTOCK: I'm referring to the entire affidavit, your Honor. I realize those paragraphs that you -- 15, 16, 17, 18, are specifically directed towards the issue, but the entire affidavit goes to the impact of the harm that will enure to the company.

THE COURT: All right. I mean, it seems to me fairly conclusory just to say that in my experience, the delisting of a company drives the company rapidly into a state of insolvency. And dissolution isn't too much to hang one's hat on, particularly since, presumably, the announcement of a suspension and the forthcoming delisting would probably have the same effect, and a stay wouldn't -- I mean, I assume a stay is not going to increase the prospects of getting bridge loans or other capital into the company.

MR. FENSTERSTOCK: I think a stay of execution does

preserve some economic stability. And all we're asking for is a preservation of the status quo to stay execution of this company, where no -- when you balance the hardships, there can't be anything said on the other side.

THE COURT: I want to hear from Mr. Martin, then we're going to wrap this up.

Mr. Martin, if we get to the TRO analysis, right, then I've got a number of considerations, which include irreparable harm, include likelihood of success on the merits, but also, you know, balancing the equities among the parties and public interest. Senator Specter is here to talk about, I think, really that latter one primarily.

I don't want to shortchange you, Senator, but I think that's principally what you're arguing, that there are real public policy implications to not granting a stay, right?

MR. SPECTER: Well, that certainly is a central point, but I also raise the issue of the opportunity for a discussion on the letters which are attached to -- with the affidavit from Mr. Fensterstock on the background of the sole shareholders whose affidavit is here with Eric Noll, the key NASDAQ official on the board, once those conversations could take place. And Mr. Noll asked for telephone time with me, and then apparently was told by Mr. Knight not to have the conversation but that I should reach out to Mr. Knight, which I had done before but did again. And I think those conversations will be very important,

hinging really on the issue of the discovery.

If these board members know that they had the power to activate a board review, and Mr. Noll and Mr. Staloff got together, and that was my intervention in the case, could have been very, very material, we might not be here taking several hours of this Court's time, had those two then talked. And if they talked, and this afternoon, we might not be back here on some other day.

THE COURT: Look, that may be true. I'm focused right now just on the standard for a TRO, which is likelihood of success on the merits. And I think we've talked about that some. The likely irreparable harm in the absence of the injunction, balance of equities in favor of the moving party, which is Cleantech over NASDAQ or the SEC, and then that the injunction is in the public interest.

MR. SPECTER: Your Honor, there has not been real discussion on the likelihood on the merits. That has really not been explored.

What you have here is a long process for the listing of Cleantech, and then shortly before the listing was actually made, where Cleantech did not know that the listing was imminent, there was a bridge loan which was participated in by the consultant.

Now, NASDAQ knew the consultant was in this picture for months and had taken no action. But when the NASDAQ found

out that the bridge loan was being activated and hadn't been told about it, they used that as the occasion to act against Cleantech. There has not been a maturation, your Honor, on likelihood of success on the merits.

THE COURT: I don't mean to interrupt you, just briefly, it seems to me that the failure to exhaust goes to likelihood of success on the merits.

Mr. Martin, that's part of your argument with likelihood of success on the merits, right?

I just want to give him a chance to answer.

MR. SPECTER: There has not been a presentation made of likelihood of success on the merits.

THE COURT: Well, but if -- a failure to exhaust would be a basis to deny the motion on the merits, right?

MR. SPECTER: Well, if there is a showing of likelihood of success on the merits, that would lead the court not to conclude that there had been a failure to exhaust. Showing of a likelihood of success on the merits is necessary in order to avoid failure to exhaust remedies. We have not really gotten into the likelihood of success on the merits. We have not gotten into the fact —

THE COURT: Who is this? I just had somebody sort of scurry up to the table here. Can I just have people identify themselves? I know generally a lot of people come from the --

MR. SPECTER: This is Mr. Staloff, your Honor. He's

the independent trustee.

THE COURT: I have his affidavit. Just generally, if we're going to have people up here --

MR. FENSTERSTOCK: I apologize, your Honor.

THE COURT: Mr. Staloff, you can have a seat. I don't mind you having a seat at the table. Just I don't have marshals for civil matters, but I have a criminal matter after this. So the marshals are looking at me curiously to see why people are sort of sneaking up to the front table.

MR. SPECTER: Your Honor, I was on the point that there was a hearing panel which ruled, and then it went to a listing counsel. And the listing counsel felt substantial — found substantial problems with what the hearing panel had done. And it remanded the case back to the hearing panel on the merits on a question of whether there had been a violation of attorney-client privilege. This case has a lot in it that your Honor hasn't heard.

THE COURT: I only know the tip of the iceberg from what's in the papers. I understand that.

MR. SPECTER: But when you deal with a question of likelihood of success on the merits, there is a great deal here on the merits of the case which show that Cleantech would prevail on the merits.

And this business about following the rules of NASDAQ, where any single board member can activate a board review,

which was not done, well, there are intimations on the papers that have been filed that the board members never had anything to do with it. This is a very distinguished board. And if this board heard about this discrimination against the Chinese and heard about a practice by NASDAQ in limiting a Chinese company from having an opportunity in the US markets, when we were trying to find an opportunity for American companies on the gigantic Chinese markets, that's something that I have seen in detail in arguments before the international trade commission on behalf of the steel industry, the so-called trade war. Big, big issue in the editorial pages of the New York Times today. And I think if the board had wind of what's going on in this courtroom, they would haul the NASDAQ people in and say, what is going on? Let us listen to this.

THE COURT: The board of NASDAQ would haul the -MR. SPECTER: They would call Mr. Knight in. They
would call Mr. Emmons in, who said, we don't care about the
consultant's citizens guild. He's got a bad reputation.

Well, you don't convict on reputation. You just don't do that.

Emmon says you have a different standard for Chinese companies than other companies. My experience tells me that if we got into the e-mails and into the records of NASDAQ, you'd find a trail of blatant discrimination. But your Honor raised the point about, what if you had an African-American or gender?

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You have this red herring about no state action. could have a violation of due process without having state action. You could have a violation of constitutional rights or fairness. We have not gotten a semblance of it. That is what piqued my interest when I saw what was happening to the That shouldn't happen in America. That shouldn't Chinese. happen by NASDAQ, a big powerful outlet like that. And they acted here to delist for no reason at all, absolutely no The presence of the consultant was known for a long time. NASDAO had had him in for hours. But they used this bridge loan, which was indispensable to keep the company alive, and Apollo, a very reputable investment banking company or house, said to delist on that was something in the interest of the shareholders.

We have cited in our papers the statement of the SEC commissioner that what should be done here is to encourage companies to grow. And this Cleantech is a growing company. It's green energy. That's what green energy is coming from, China; not coming from the United States. New Jersey wants to put these towers up. Well, they can't buy them from American companies. This company was denied an opportunity to bid on \$8.4 million.

THE COURT: But that's, again, water under the bridge in terms of irreparable harm. The issue is what's going to happen between now, if I vacate the TRO in the state court and

deny the motion for it, a TRO here? What's going to happen in the interim between now and when the SEC finally gets around to ruling on the appeal?

MR. SPECTER: Well, you can slice it to irreparable harm, but it's very relevant on the issue of prevailing on the merits, of ultimate success if this case is heard. That's a separate point from the irreparable harm issue. And I heard your question extensively, Mr. Fensterstock, about Mr. Staloff's affidavit. Well, you have Bill Uchimoto's affidavit.

THE COURT: I quoted that, but that seems equally conclusory with respect to what's going to happen next.

MR. SPECTER: Well, no, it wasn't, your Honor. You have questioned a difference of being relisted after you'd been delisted. You think it doesn't make a whole lot of difference. There's been an extensive dialogue on that point with your saying, well, they ought to put him back into the status quo of Mr. Fensterstock pointing out NASDAQ won't do anything without being told. They won't even turn over papers of record.

THE COURT: No, but this is what Mr. Uchimoto says:

Lifting the TRO and allowing the effectiveness of the final
delisting will cause irreparable harm to the company and its
public shareholders. That's pretty conclusory.

Next paragraph: A change from the company's status from suspended from listing to being delisted could have

significant adverse effects on the company's common stock and investor and public perception of the continuing viability and business prospects of the company. Again, pretty conclusory.

Next, paragraph seven: A delisting may make it materially more difficult, if not impossible, for the company once again to become listed on NASDAQ or another registered national securities exchange. But, again, that one I didn't find persuasive at all. If they prevail with the SEC or with the Court of Appeals, then they're back listed. And I don't think there's any additional hoops or hurdles that can be put up that would prevent their delisting.

Then paragraph eight, a final delisting will also have a deleterious effect on any covenants, indentures or agreements requiring the company to remain in the status of a listed company. I don't know if there are any such covenants, indentures or agreements.

MR. SPECTER: Well, your Honor, it's inartful but it's not deficient.

THE COURT: It's not?

MR. SPECTER: It's unartful but it's not deficient. Anybody who would say could when they should have said would ought to go back to drafting school.

THE COURT: Well, just more detailed than that is what's really necessary.

MR. SPECTER: Well, where you have a requirement that

if you could be relisted, your stock has to be worth four dollars a share. If you haven't been delisted, it only has to be worth one dollar a share. That's in the papers.

You take Bill Uchimoto's affidavit and you take Arnold Staloff's affidavit, you can parse them finely and say there are holes in them. But the totality of them and common sense shows that you have a prejudice by delisting. Your Honor brought the point up in a very concrete term, the difference between being suspended and expelled. That is a powerful argument on irreparable harm.

THE COURT: Maybe. But, look, if you are the suspended student and you're suspended indefinitely pending the Board of Education reviewing the suspension, and, you know, they decide to call you expelled but the review by the Board of Education is still taking place, I'm not sure, to me, it makes that much difference to the student who's not allowed to go to class or not allowed to participate in school activities. It seems to be a matter of nomenclature more than practical reality.

Now, that's an analogy that might be an imperfect analogy, but certain other courts have found delisting not to be irreparable harm. And I'm not sure it's enough in this record for me to find there really has been.

MR. SPECTER: Your Honor, those conclusory statements by those courts don't involve this factual situation. Without

repeating it, they are very sketchy. You have Judge Sotomayor opinion when she was on the district court saying there is a paucity of authority. I think Mr. Fensterstock really hit a very valid point. When you said to me, well, do you have any authority which says that a state court can grant an injunction under these circumstances, and Mr. Fensterstock came around and said, do you have any authority that the state court can't issue an injunction under, or a TRO under these circumstances? We had an extensive argument on this point and the judge — very well respected in the commercial section of the New York State Supreme Court. And here you have an issue which really goes to the very basis of federalism.

THE COURT: Look, I don't think we really want everybody doing end runs around the SEC and running in to state court for stays and for TROs when the scheme that Congress enacted allows for a stay and allows for federal review of the administrative decision at the Court of Appeals level. You could cut straight to the Court of Appeals. It strikes me as what Congress decided to do. They could have decided to do something different, but they didn't.

MR. SPECTER: Congress makes some mistakes, too. That's why you have courts.

THE COURT: You're looking at me when you say that.

MR. SPECTER: Congress made a mistake in not raising your pay.

THE COURT: Well, I don't take it personally. 1 MR. SPECTER: Justice Kennedy and Chief Justice 2 3 Roberts came to talk to the Chairman of the Judiciary Committee. He wanted to raise your pay by \$100,000, from 174 4 5 to 274. 6 THE COURT: Wow. Don't tell my wife. 7 MR. SPECTER: Well, that's a fact. I'll give you an affidavit on it. I was there. 8 9 THE COURT: I don't think we're going to get that 10 genie back in the bottle. 11 MR. SPECTER: By the time it moved through, we were in 12 a recession. Nobody got a pay raise. Federal compensations 13 are going to be suspended through 2013, if the Tea Party has 14 its way. But the administrative procedures of the SEC leaves a 15 lot to be desired. 16 THE COURT: Look, you may get -- it could be the case 17 that you get all the relief you're seeking this afternoon. I'm at least inclined to wait until the end of the day. 18 MR. FENSTERSTOCK: Your Honor, first of all, I want to 19 20 thank you for giving us all the time you've given us. I really 21 appreciate it. I want to make two more quick points. 22 THE COURT: Judge Forrest owes me. 23 MR. FENSTERSTOCK: That's true. 24 THE COURT: This is fascinating. I enjoy it. We need

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to cut it short, I think.

MR. FENSTERSTOCK: Two very quick points, 30 seconds.

The reason why Mr. Staloff jumped up and was so eager to come up, he just handed me a note and he said -- and I'm going to read it, and he will provide an affidavit, if the Court desires -- the \$20 million bridge loan is contingent on listing. And if C-tech -- that's Cleantech -- is delisted, the finance company can take the assets. I've offered to be called to testify on this.

THE COURT: I think an affidavit would be useful, and you probably ought to send that to the SEC as well.

MR. FENSTERSTOCK: We will do that.

And also, your Honor, I just want to reference you to -- on the irreparable harm, just redirect your attention to my affidavit in state court, Exhibit 12, which includes the letter to NASDAQ from Apollo Capital Management, which is a \$68 billion asset under management company, which talked about irreparable harm as well.

Thank you, your Honor.

THE COURT: Mr. Martin, I wanted to give you a chance to be heard. I mean, balance of equities, balance of the equities between the parties is one factor that I am to consider. What is the harm to NASDAQ by just staying this thing? Wouldn't it be cheaper in the long run if you get what you want, I vacate the state, I decline to grant a TRO here because I think the SEC process hasn't been exhausted, they

then get something tomorrow or next week that says the stay is denied, then you are writing up new papers and everybody is running into the Ninth Circuit or the DC circuit? Why is it worth all this effort?

MR. MARTIN: Frankly, if it goes to the Ninth Circuit, we think the respondent in that proceeding would be the SEC.

NASDAQ might be able to intervene.

THE COURT: I see.

MR. MARTIN: But in terms of the irreparable harm to NASDAQ, the danger here is creating basically a blueprint in which any party aggrieved by an SRO action, at least in the delisting context, if not more broadly, could then run in to court and seek a TRO.

THE COURT: Excuse me one second.

MR. MARTIN: So at least based on the affidavits we have before us, who knows what they might come up with later. But the affidavits here could be raised by anyone.

The claim that in my experience the delisting of a company often drives the company rapidly into a state of insolvency and dissolution, well, if that were irreparable harm, then any company facing delisting would then be able to go to a board and seek a TRO. So what NASDAQ is concerned about is the long-term effects of a decision that says that this company, based on the allegations here, gets to blow up the delisting process without going through the usual review

scheme through the SEC and the Court of Appeals. So that, we believe, is the most significant harm from this.

Now, to be clear, we don't think that there is any balance at all because we don't think they've established irreparable injury, but we do believe there is a substantial concern that they create a blueprint that could be used in any case based on any conceivable allegations of alleged wrongdoing.

In terms of the public interest, we think there's a substantial public interest in having the process work as Congress designed it, and that is to have companies delisted as provided in NASDAQ's rules. And if the rules are violated, then to have that addressed by the SEC and then at Court of Appeals. Right now they're saying, no, we want to stay a listed company pending review. But the SEC gets to decide whether they stay a delisted company pending review. And one of the things it can consider is the potential harm to investors as shares were traded in the over-the-counter market, based on the statement that this is still — this company, even to NASDAQ, has made a final determination to delist.

For those reasons we think even if this Court concludes they've exhausted, we don't think they have. That's a jurisdictional defect. And even if it concludes there's a likelihood of success on the merits, even though the Second Circuit and the DC circuit have said you don't get to go into

federal district court to try to stop SRO regulatory activity, and even if they've established irreparable harm, even though they haven't -- almost conclusory or incorrect assertions in the affidavits, they haven't met any of the other factors either.

So for those reasons we would submit the Court should not grant a new TRO, if it chooses to vacate the state court TRO.

THE COURT: All right. I'm going to reserve very briefly and just see what, if anything, comes in today. And if plaintiffs want to submit a revised affidavit, I'm happy to take that. If the defendants want to do the same, they're welcome to do that as well.

But I think I get the issues.

I want to thank all the lawyers and others who took time out of the holiday season to be here. Obviously this matter is a great deal to both sets of clients, so I understand the significance of the matter. And I will turn this around quickly. I want to think about the arguments you've made and see what else I get and what else I hear from the SEC, okay?

Thank you all.

(Adjourned)